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WINGFOOT

TWENTYGRA
GEISLAUTERN
WEHRDEN
HOSTENBACH
ST. AVOID
HILL 283
LAUTERBACH
LUDWEILER
HEPPENHEIM
WEINHEIM
UFFENHEIM
BAD MERGENTHEIM
GOLLHOFEN
DISTELHAUSEN
BURG AU
HEILBRONN
KAPPEL
WINKEL
SAALFELDEN
BAD GASTEIN
BAD AIBLING
HOCHSCHLOSS
HOLZKIRCHEN
SEESHaupt
WELHEIM
DILLIGEN
Merkendorf
Geisslingen
GELCHEIM
AMORBACH
LAMPERTHEIM
WORMS
FRANKENECK
PIRMASENS
SAINT INGERT
BUBINGEN
SCHAFFHAUSEN

HISTORY


101st CAVALRY GROUP, MECHANIZED

WINGFOOT

**RHINELAND and
CENTRAL EUROPE
: CAMPAIGNS :**



**OFFICIAL HISTORY
101ST CAVALRY GROUP
(MECHANIZED)**





To the men of Wingfoot:

Herein is the account of our common adventures; of the trail we blazed across the rivers, plains and mountains of Germany and Austria. It is rendered in a simple but detailed outline, like a black and white etching, awaiting the colors of our individual experiences and memories. There are many accomplishments on the record of which we may be proud, yet let us be ever mindful of the price paid by those who will not come home to exult in our common victory.

Colonel, U. S. Army
Commanding

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Illustrations by Captain Crozier Wood

Major Mercer W. Sweeney, Editor

Souvenir Booklet Published for Members of The 101st Cavalry Group, Mechanized.

Printed by Hugo Diesbach Ww., Weinheim/Bergstr., Germany

AUGUST 1945

PASSED BY THE FIELD PRESS CENSOR FOR MAILING



Foreword

The story of the 101st Cavalry in the annals of American Arms in Combat began in the year 1898 during the Spanish-American War. The first baptism of fire came at Coamo, Porto Rico, where Troop "C", one of the parent organizations, served with distinction. In 1916, Squadron "A" (Manhattan), the oldest of the parent units, remained a separate squadron while Troop "B" (Geneseo), the youngest, and other up-State Troops joined with the now Squadron "C" (Brooklyn), to form the 1st New York Cavalry. All served on the Mexican Border. In 1917 these horse cavalry units were reorganized into separate Machine Gun Battalions of the 27th Division and, as such, served brilliantly throughout the crucial 1918 campaigns of World War I.

In 1920 the horse organizations were reestablished and in 1922 the 1st New York Cavalry was redesignated the 101st Cavalry. Several reorganizations took place in the following years. In January 1941, the unit was inducted into the Army of the United States as a Horse-Mechanized Regiment and became fully mechanized after our entry into World War II. Reorganization from a Regiment to a Group took place in December 1943. The personnel now consisted of men and officers representing every State of the Union who stood

shoulder to shoulder with the men from New York under the standard which proudly flew the Battle Streamers of 1898 and 1918. Together these men gallantly have attached two additional streamers to the 101st Cavalry standard — "Rhine-land" and "Central Europe". This is their story.

Early redeployment of the units of the Group did much to direct the choice of contents for this booklet. This and the limitations of time, opportunity and available facilities confined the project within the scope of the material immediately at hand.

The "Reports After Action Against Enemy" are presented in their original form as forwarded for filing in the official archives of the War Department. The title "WING FOOT" is taken from our battle code name which proved to be most prophetic.

While no effort is made at this time to describe in dramatic detail the heroism, fortitude and sacrifices of individual members and units, this booklet does provide the essentials of background and factual data for the production of such an historical document at a future date. Marching between each and every line of the text, however, is pride in organization and the vitality, personality and laughter of the men — all of the men of the 101st CAVALRY GROUP.



January



The choice of a setting in which to place the beginning of this narrative history in outline is made without a second thought. BARROW-IN-FURNESS! Situated in the Northwest of England, Furness is a bit remote even from its own Lancashire. This rugged Old World peninsula sparkles like a lovely jewel when the stubborn north-country sun brushes aside the eternal rains which come sweeping in on high winds from the Irish Sea.

It was in Furness that the men of the 101st Cavalry Group stretched their sea legs and settled down to make final preparations for the job ahead. They were the first Americans billeted in that particular section of England. The people seemed as reluctant hosts at first, but it was not long before their native friendliness and deep sense of hospitality reached out in genuine welcome to these equally friendly and well behaved "Yanks". BARROW-IN-FURNESS, Camp Anty Cross, and the good folk of all Furness always will hold a warm place in the hearts and memories of these men.

Perfection Is Sought After

Flashing back to home shores for a moment ... let it be recorded here that no group of soldiers ever worked more diligently for the privilege of entering the fight than did the officers and men of the 101st Cavalry Group. In England they continued to work with undiminished zeal and efficiency. They met every demand against time, energy, ingenuity and patience. They opened every door and followed every lead in their search for perfection in detail. They never were satisfied. This bit of unit character was built through years of intelligent self-criticism which discouraged some along the way but finally proved its true worth in the preparation of the unit for actual combat. They knew that the term "100 per cent" could have only one meaning and one result. They achieved that result.

Vignettes And Questions

Life in England became a series of flashing vignettes and unanswered questions ... Christmas Eve with its rapier like thoughts of home; midnight services and the mess hall afterwards with steaming hot coffee, thousands of doughnuts and the Red Cross girls who made them ... the little English Carol singers ... New Years Eve also brought many disturbing thoughts. Some listened to the local "bellringers" as they pealed in the New Year and then quietly went to bed. Others made an attempt to transplant the gayety of an American New Years Eve ... all looked about them as

they sang the old year out and the New Year in ... Would the orders never come? Would it be the big fight or one of the "sideshows"? Would the Group be broken-up or fight as a unit? What Army would it be? What Corps? ... Most of these questions were not to be answered for a long time but the orders to move finally came with BARTON-STACEY in southern England the first stop. And then to the marshalling area at SOUTHAMPTON and a midnight ride to the docks where hours of waiting in the rain cast the mood.

Destination Known At Last

A small convoy of LST's and Liberty ships gathered offshore and waited for the night to close-in. An overcast sky and a moderate sea formed the backdrop to an uneventful crossing of the English Channel ... A sprawling heap of rubble, once the bustling Port of Le Havre, and the sour glances of the local citizens were soon exchanged for sunny roads, picturesque villages and the smiling people of inland Normandy — and the gumbo mud of Camp Twenty Grand ... On past the outskirts of Paris to bivouac in SOISSONS and then at VERDUN where the men of World War I slept nearby ... Finally, it was known — it was to be the Sixth Army Group's Seventh Army and the XV Corps. The orders were to relieve the 106th Cavalry Group with headquarters in Lauterbach, Germany on the SAAR RIVER FRONT.



HEADQUARTERS
101st Cavalry Group, Mecz
APO 758, U. S. Army

15 February 1945

SUBJECT: Historical Data.

TO: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.


THRU: Command Channels.

1. In accordance with the provisions of AR 345 - 105, dated 18 November 1929, and Change 4, dated 10 August 1944; letter Hq ETOUSA, subj: "Handling of Historical Documents in the European Theater of Operations", file AG 312.1 Op History, dated 14 July 1944, and Section IV, Circular No. 34, Headquarters Seventh Army, dated 28 November 1944, the following report is submitted.

2. During the period 1 January 1945 — 2 February 1945, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., was commanded by Colonel Charles B. McClelland, with Lt Col Leo W. Mortenson as Executive Officer.

3. The 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., is composed of the following elements:

- a. Hq & Hq Troop, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz.
Colonel C. B. McClelland, Commanding
Lt Col L. W. Mortenson, Executive Officer
- b. 101st Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Lt Col M. Kendall, Commanding
Major H. J. Brock, Executive Officer
- c. 116th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Lt Col H. C. Leonard, Commanding
Major R. D. Feagin, Executive Officer



4. Narrative History

a. On 1 Jan 1945, the 101st Cav Gp was stationed at Camp Anty-Cross, DALTON IN FURNESS, LANCASHIRE, ENGLAND, preparing to move to FRANCE to assume any mission which might be assigned by CG ETOUSA. Necessary modification of combat vehicles and equipment which had accompanied the unit overseas had been completed in December 1944.

b. In order to facilitate the final preparation for movement, the unit moved on 4 January by road and rail to Camp C, BARTON STACEY, HAMPSHIRE, ENGLAND.

c. During the period 5 — 28 Jan, general purpose vehicles (approximately 250) were drawn from Ordnance Depots and serviced and modified (racks, etc.) by the unit maintenance sections. The necessary supplies and equipment to complete the unit 100% were also drawn with the exception of portions of the basic ammunition load.

d. On 29 Jan, the 101st Cav Gp, Mecz, departed Camp C BARTON STACEY and marched to the SOUTHAMPTON Marshalling Area, closing at Camp C - 5, 291200.

e. The 101st Cav Gp (less a marching party of 553 officers and enlisted men) departed Camp C-5 0545, 30 Jan and em-

barked at SOUTHAMPTON aboard 4 LSTs and 2 Liberty Ships. The marching party was embarked on a troop transport.

f. Moving in convoy, the unit arrived at LE HAVRE, FRANCE, and at 311020 the first vehicles of the Group Headquarters were disembarked from their LST. The remainder of the LST's were unloaded and the units marched 44 miles in separate serials, to Camp TWENTY GRAND vic. DUCCLAIR, FRANCE, closing approximately 312400. The Reconnaissance troops of both Squadrons were aboard two Liberty Ships which were routed up the SEINE RIVER to ROUEN. The marching party was disembarked at LE HAVRE and moved by GMT to TWENTY GRAND, rejoining their units 311130.


g. The Reconnaissance troops were disembarked at ROUEN, 1 Feb 1945, closing at TWENTY GRAND at 0300 2 Feb.



CHARLES B. Mc CLELLAND
Colonel, Cavalry
Commanding



MAP I



February



COn the 9th day of February 1945 men from the two original Squadrons of the 101st CAVALRY GROUP took their place in the front lines for the first time. While it was not fully realized at that time, they were ready for combat. Four years of hard and conscientious training in the United States was to prove itself early in the fighting. There was much still to be learned, however, the "hard way". Especially difficult was the task these men faced of fighting as infantrymen when their equipment and training was strictly for Mechanized Cavalry work. They quickly overcame these obstacles and difficulties and it was not long before they were battlewise and hardened to the unpleasant tasks which are the lot of the combat soldier. The acid test of unrelenting and continuous night and day responsibility now fell upon the elements and machinery of command. There was to be no respite for a period of 85 consecutive days.

Courage, Fortitude And Death

Here on the Saar River Front the first impact of sudden death was felt as it struck down close personal friends and valued comrades. All came to know the full meaning of honest fear and to respect it in others. Attitudes toward the enemy changed from slightly apprehensive curiosity to cold and calculating anger. The maze of mines and booby traps in this area plagued the men at every step and took their toll. The enemy's ability to use his weapons effectively and his skill at concealment came in for full appreciation and study. Men earned a new respect for each other and without thinking in the terms of themselves wondered at man's capacity for courage and especially did they wonder at the fortitude of those so grievously wounded.

Entire Western Front Flares

"ATTACK!" No man ever forgets the first time he receives orders to attack. Nor does he forget his own feelings which, between stimulation of the senses and sobered thinking, become a series of alternating hot and cold mental flashes. The inevitable period of waiting now set in. Postponements and changes of plan as well as other vexing problems arose. These proved to be the outgrowth of the Supreme Commander's decision to strike the final blow. Thus, the planned local attack became, finally after the turn of the month, a part of the opening over-all assault along the Western Front.

HEADQUARTERS
101st Cavalry Group, Mecz
APO 758, U. S. Army

19 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy, Reports After.

TO: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

THRU: Command Channels.

1. In accordance with the provisions of AR 345-105, dated 18 November 1929, and Change 4, dated 10 August 1944; letter Hq ETOUSA, subj: "Handling of Historical Documents in the European Theater of Operations", file AG 312.1 Op History dated 14 July 1944, and Section IV, Circular No. 34, Headquarters Seventh Army, dated 28 November 1944, the following report is submitted.

2. * The inclosed reports and journals with supporting documents constitute the historical records of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., for the period 1 February 1945 — 28 February 1945.

3. During the period covered by this report, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., was commanded by Colonel Charles B. McClelland, with Lt Col Leo W. Mortenson as Executive Officer.

4. Narrative History.

a. 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., remained in Camp TWENTY GRAND, FRANCE, from 1 February 1945 through 4 February. Garrison duties were performed and equipment was prepared for further movement. Pursuant to Troop Assignment No. 18, Headquarters Twelfth Army Group, 23 January 1945, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., was attached to the Fifteenth U. S. Army, relieved from assignment to the Twelfth Army Group and assigned to the Sixth Army Group. In accordance with Unit Assignment

* Not included herein.

Order No. 18, Headquarters Sixth Army Group, 27 January 1945, it was subsequently assigned to the Seventh Army.

b. Pursuant to Movement Order No. 2-17, Headquarters District A, Normandy Base Section, Com Z, European T of Opns, 4 February 1945, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., departed Camp TWENTY GRAND, FRANCE, en route to LUNEVILLE, FRANCE, on 5 February 1945, crossed IP, ST. JEAN de CARDONEY, NORMANDY, at 0946A, closed in bivouac SOISSONS, FRANCE, 1952A. Departed SOISSONS, FRANCE, 6 February 1945; crossed IP 0700A, closed in bivouac, VERDUN, FRANCE, 2130A. VOGC Seventh Army were received night 6-7 February 1945, changing destination from LUNEVILLE, FRANCE, to the FAULQUEMONT area, FRANCE. Departed VERDUN, FRANCE, 7 February 1945; crossed IP 0700A, closed in bivouac ST. AVOLD, FRANCE, 1630A.

c. Pursuant to Operations Instruction No. 75, Headquarters Seventh Army, 6 February 1945, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., was attached to the XV Corps upon arrival in the FAULQUEMONT area, and directed to relieve the 106th Cavalry Group, Mecz., in its defensive mission.

d. The 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., remained in bivouac at ST. AVOLD, FRANCE, 7-8 February 1945 and moved to LAUTERBACH, GERMANY, 9 February 1945. The Group CP and that of the 116th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mecz., were established in LAUTERBACH, GERMANY, on 9 February 1945, and the CP of the 101st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mecz., was established in CARLSBRUNN, GERMANY, on the same date.

e. The relief of the 106th Cavalry Group, Mecz., along the line EMMERS-

WEILLER, GERMANY - WADGASSEN, GERMANY, both exclusive, was begun on 9 February 1945 and completed on 11 February 1945. Control of the sector passed to 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., at 1200A, 11 February 1945. Dispositions were in accordance with FO No. 4, this headquarters, 11 February 1945. The following major units were attached to the Group:

17th FA Group:

Col J. C. McLaughlin, Commanding

93rd Armd FA Bn:

Lt Col John Shanklin, III, Commanding

802nd FA Bn:

Lt Col N. Landon Head, Commanding

1185th Engr (C) Group:

Col W. F. Weiler, Commanding

48th Engr (C) Bn:

Maj J. E. Foley, Jr., Commanding



165th Engr (C) Bn:
Lt Col C. H. Schelling, Commanding
2756th Engr (C) Bn:
Maj F. J. Lund, Commanding
2nd Chemical Mortar Bn:
Lt Col D. W. Meyerson, Commanding.

In addition the Group was supported by an Air Support Party, an IPW team, and detachments of Allied Military Government and Counter Intelligence Corps.

f. Pursuant to Operations Instructions No. 115, Headquarters XV Corps, 8 February 1945, plans were prepared for an attack to rectify and shorten the Corps front line. FO No. 5, this headquarters, 16 February 1945, covering the contemplated action was issued to all units concerned. Troops were regrouped in anticipation of this action. The 165th Engr (C) Bn relieved the 101st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mecz., in its sector at 172400; the latter assembling in Group reserve at Carlsbrunn, Germany. Additional attachments for the contemplated attack were:

Troop E, 106th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Troop E, 121st Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co A, 749th Tank Bn.

The date and time of attack were contingent upon the progress of other Corps units. It was not undertaken up to the close of the period covered herein.

g. The defensive mission in the Group sector was successfully accomplished throughout the period 11 February 1945 - 28 February 1945.

h. Pursuant to letter of Headquarters Seventh Army, 25 February 1945, subject:

"Attachment Order" (AG 370.5 - C) the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., was relieved of attachment to the XV Corps and attached to the XXI Corps on 28 February 1945.

5. Miscellaneous.

a. Lt Col Hubert C. Leonard, Commanding Officer, 106th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mecz., was wounded in action by enemy mortar fire on 22 February 1945. Major R. Douglas Feagin, Squadron Executive Officer, Assumed command on that date.

b. Total casualties of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., for the period:


Killed in Action	5
Wounded in Action	15
Missing in Action	3
Non-battle Casualties	11

c. Nine prisoners of war were taken during the period.

d. Adjacent units:

Right (S/E) 70th Infantry Division.
Left (N/W) 26th Infantry Division.

6. The 101st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mecz., and the 116th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mecz., were attached to this headquarters during the period of this report.



CHAS. B. McCLELLAND
Colonel, Cavalry
Commanding.



March



A friendly fog which did not lift until the sun was at its mid-day height covered the initial stages of the attack on the 14th of March. When night fell on the day following all enemy along the Group front were either captured or destroyed. More than fifty per cent of all casualties were the result of sniper fire. Each and every house had to be cleared. This was a first success and while the men were fully aware of the determined fighting character of their enemy they now stood firm in the knowledge that they had beaten him and could do so again and again ... and did!


St. Ingbert Is Captured

Swinging to the right, these units met their next test in the fighting before the Siegfried Line. Some of the best young leaders and troopers paid for the ground gained at this point. The dueling of artillery was nothing short of terrific with the friendly guns (thankfully) having the upper hand. Finally, the Combat Engineers cut and blew their way through barbed wire entanglements and rows of concrete "Dragon's Teeth". The initial taste of actual Mechanized Cavalry action was now at hand as was the first deep run into enemy held territory. Passing through the "hole" in the outer crust of the line, elements of the Group struck out through miles of narrow valley roads dominated by great frowning pillboxes which for some unknown reason were unmanned. Thus the Siegfried Line was penetrated throughout its entire depth and the town of St. Ingbert was captured for the 63rd Division to which the Group was attached at the time.

Crossing Of The Rhine

Returning to direct control of the XXI Corps, to which it had been recently reassigned, the Group moved into the Hartz Mountains where several days were spent profitably in mopping up scattered groups of enemy who were seeking to escape over the mountain trails. On the move again and through the vineyards of the Rhine Valley all elements of the Group crossed the famous river via a ponton bridge at Worms on the "second day" and moved into the beautiful Odenwald country which gave birth to the legends made internationally famous through the great musical works of Richard Wagner. Here the fighting became determined and, from village to village, and town to town, the Group pounded its way forward steadily.

MAP II



HEADQUARTERS
101st Cavalry Group, Mecz
APO 758, U. S. Army

4 June 1945.

SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy, Reports After.

TO: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

THRU: Command Channels.

1. In accordance with the provisions of AR 345-105, dated 18 November 1929, and Change 4, dated 10 August 1944; letter Hq ETOUSA, subj: "Handling of Historical Documents in the European Theater of Operations", file AG 312.1 Op History dated 14 July 1944, and Section IV, Circular No. 34, Headquarters Seventh Army, dated 28 November 1944, the following report is submitted.

2. * The inclosed reports and journals with supporting documents constitute the historical records of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., for the period 1 March 1945 — 31 March 1945.

3. During the period covered by this report, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., was commanded by Colonel Charles B. McClelland, with Lt Col Leo W. Mortenson as Executive Officer.


4. COMPOSITION.

There was no change in the composition of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., from that noted in Unit History for the period 1 January 1945 — 2 February 1945.

5. NARRATIVE HISTORY.

a. The 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, continued its defensive mission along the line EMMERSWEILLER, GERMANY — WADGASSEN, GERMANY, both exclusive, from 1 March 1945 to 13 March 1945. During that

* Not included herein.



period, the following attachments and detachments were made on the dates indicated:

Detached:

17th FA Group †	1 March 1945
93rd Armd FA Bn (SP) †	1 March 1945
802nd FA Bn †	1 March 1945
1185th Engr (C) Group	8 March 1945
48th Engr (C) Bn	10 March 1945
165th Engr (C) Bn	10 March 1945
2756th Engr (C) Bn	10 March 1945
2d Cml Bn	10 March 1945

† Remained in direct support until 15 March 1945.

Attached:

Co A, 1 Rcn Plat 822d	
TD Bn (T)	8 March 1945
Co B, 99th Cml Mortar	
Bn	8 March 1945


The 17th FA Group was reinforced by the attachment of the 969th FA Bn (M) on 7 March 1945. The Group Command Post moved to LUDWEILER, GERMANY, 9 March 1945.

b. During the night 13 - 14 March 1945, combat patrols from the 101st and 116th Cav Rcn Sqs, Mecz, made deep penetrations of the enemy positions to their front. From the information gained, operations to clear the enemy from the south bank of the SAAR, RIVER in the 101st Cavalry

Group, Mecz, zone were initiated on 14 March 1945, and successfully completed on 15 March 1945. These operations resulted in a general advance of approximately 2500 meters, the capture or destruction of all enemy forces south of the SAAR RIVER in the Group Zone, and the capture of the towns of GEISLAUTERN, WEHRDEN, SCHAFFHAUSEN and HOSTENBACH, all Germany. Many casualties were inflicted upon the enemy and 54 prisoners of war were taken. Casualties of 2 killed and 31 wounded were suffered by elements of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz (for detailed account of this operation, see Inclosure No. 1).

c. (1) Pursuant to Opns Instns No. 39, Headquarters XXI Corps, 16 March 1945, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, was attached to the 63rd Infantry Division and directed to assemble vicinity of HELLMER, FRANCE, after the relief of the Group's front line units by elements of the 70th Infantry Division had been completed. The Group closed in the prescribed area at 171100A. Co A, 1 Rcn Plat, 822d TD Bn (T) and Co B, 99th Cml Mortar Bn were relieved of attachment to the Group upon its departure from the WEHRDEN-HOSTENBACH area. The 93rd AFA Bn (105 mm), Co K, 253rd Infantry and the 63rd Cav Rcn Troop, Mecz, were attached to the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, upon its arrival in the HELLMER area.





(2) In compliance with VOGC, 63rd Infantry Division, 17 March 1945, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, reinforced, relieved the 253rd Infantry in its positions facing the SIEGFRIED LINE along the general line ENSHEIM - GUDINGEN, both Germany, at 172103A with the mission to defend present positions and maintain contact with the enemy by aggressive patrolling.

Command Posts were established as follows:

101st Cav Gp, Mecz — WINTRINGHOF, GERMANY,

101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz — ESCHRINGEN, GERMANY,

116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz — BUBINGEN, Germany,

92nd AFA Bn (105 mm) — KLEINSBITTERS DORF, GERMANY.

Vehicles were parked in rear assembly areas.

(3) Front line positions were garrisoned and aggressive patrolling to the front and laterally was conducted throughout 18 - 19 March 1945. In the late afternoon, 19 March 1945, indications of enemy withdrawal were noted and a reconnaissance in force was begun early 20 March 1945. The former Group front line was outposted, and both squadrons moved forward in their respective zones against scattered enemy resistance. Progress was impeded by dense enemy A.T. and A.P. minefields, demolished bridges, road blocks and craters. Co K, 253rd Infantry and 63rd Cav Rcn Troop, Mecz, were relieved from attachment to the 101st Cav Gp, Mecz at 200730A.

(4) At 201000A, Tr A, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, atchd 1 Plat Tr E and 1 Plat Co F, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, Captain Albert Burgess, Commanding, was assigned the mission of moving rapidly to the

division right flank, proceeding by any available route through the main defenses of the SIEGFRIED LINE and capturing the town of ST. INGBERT. This mission was accomplished at 201535A and escape routes to the West and Northwest were blocked.

(5) At 201400A, the 101st Cav Gp, Mecz (less Tr A, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz), received the mission to sweep the zone BREBACH - RENTRICH - ENSHEIM - ST. INGBERT. This mission was accomplished by 202359A and the Group was directed to assemble; the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, vicinity of BISCHMISHEIM and the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, vicinity of BUBINGEN.


(6) At 201740A, Tr A, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was relieved at ST. INGBERT by elements of the 63rd Inf Div and directed to protect the division left flank by screening the line BREBACH - ST. INGBERT.

This mission was accomplished by 202359A and patrols were extended 2 kms to the West and Northwest of the assigned line.

(7) During this operation many casualties were inflicted upon the enemy and 104 PWs were taken. Casualties of 3 killed and 11 wounded were sustained by elements of the Group. Tr A, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, reinforced, made the first complete passage through the SIEGFRIED LINE in the Seventh Army sector and captured the town of ST. INGBERT.

(8) For detailed account of these operations, see Inclosure No. 2.

d. In accordance with Opns Instns No. 44, Headquarters XXI Corps, 21 March 1945; the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, was relieved of attachment to the 63rd Inf Div and ordered to assemble vicinity of



BITCHE, FRANCE. Troop A, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was placed on detached service with Headquarters Sixth Army Group. The 93rd AFA (105 mm) was relieved of attachment to the 101st Cav Gp, Mecz. The Group closed in its assembly area at 211900A, Hq & Hq Tr, 101st Cav Gp, Mecz, and 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, at ENCHENBERG, FRANCE, and 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, at LEMBERG, FRANCE.

e. In anticipation of a mission to reconnoiter the XXI Corps zone East of PIRMASENS, GERMANY, route reconnaissance to that area were executed on 22 March 1945, by elements of the 101st and 116th Cav Rcn Sqs, Mecz. Elements of the Group which were not so employed, devoted the day to maintenance and rehabilitation of equipment.

f. (1) German resistance West of the RHINE RIVER in the XXI Corps zone had collapsed. At 1200A, 23 March 1945, by VOGC. XXI Corps, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, was assigned the following mission:

"Move in Corps Zone behind 71st and 100th Inf Div. Sweep Corps Zone to the line NEUSTADT - LANDAU, entering each village and town, and traversing all roads with particular attention to the South flank. Report each four hours, this headquarters giving location of leading elements, conditions of roads and bridges, locations of enemy minefields, road blocks and other pertinent information. Maintain contact with 71st and 100th Inf Div." This order was later confirmed by Opns Instns No. 47, Headquarters XXI Corps, 23 March 1945. The Corps boundaries were delineated as follows: South - WALSCHBAND - HINTER-WEIDENTHAL - ANNWEILER-LANDAU; North - WALDFICHBACK-ELMSTEIN - LAMBRECHT - NEUSTADT.


(2) Elements of the 101st Cav Rcn Sq and 116th Cav Rcn Sq moved from their respective assembly areas at 231330A, and by night had reached the general line HINTER-WEIDENTHAL - LEIMAN. Hq & Hq Tr, 101st Cav Gp, halted for the night on the eastern outskirts of PIRMASENS.

(3) The mission was resumed early 24 March 1945, and all elements moved forward against scattered enemy resistance which had been by-passed by the infantry divisions. The rugged character of the terrain, and the detailed reconnaissance required by the mission, made rapid progress impossible. Forward elements reached the objective line at 241800A, thus completing the mission at that hour. The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, assembled vicinity of ELMSTEIN and the 116th Cav Rcn, Sq, Mecz, at SARNSTALL. The Group Command Post was established at FRANKENECK.

(4) As a result of this operation, casualties were inflicted on the enemy and a total of 135 prisoners of war were taken. Important enemy supply dumps, ammunition stores, weapons, hospitals and transport were found and reported to higher headquarters for disposition. The condition of roads and bridges in the Corps Zone was reported and the roads were cleared of displaced persons. One soldier in the Group was killed in action, none was wounded.

g. (1) Pursuant to Opns Instns No. 49, Headquarters XXI Corps, 24 March 1945, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, undertook the following mission on 25 March 1945:

"Assume responsibility for line of communications in Corps Zone. Mop up all remaining enemy elements in Corps Z exclusive of division assembly areas. Patrol all roads in Corps rear area,



establish road blocks and control movement of all persons. Direct or transport all non-German nationals whether PWs or displaced persons found on the roads to the DP centers located at PIRMASENS, KAISERSLAUTERN or NEUSTADT, or to the nearest town within the area capable of caring for them."

(2) During the period 25 - 27 March 1945, all units were engaged in the execution of the mission noted in paragraph g (1) above within the limits of the Corps Zone as described in par F (1) above. Road blocks and control points were established throughout the Corps Zone, Military Government proclamations were posted in all towns, weapons and other contraband were impounded and displaced persons were gathered into DP centers, MSRs and other lines of communication were patrolled 24 hours a day. The Group continued to apprehend prisoners of war.

(3) A general eastward drift of individual German soldiers and small bodies of troops had been noted for the past days. This movement was confined to the secondary roads which could not be kept under constant surveillance and through the densely wooded mountain areas. On 28 March 1945, a screen was established along the general line NEUSTADT - LANDAU; the Assault Gun Troops and Tank Companies of both squadrons being employed for this purpose. The remaining troops of each squadron moved out dismounted in their respective zones from a second line about 15 kms west of the screen, thoroughly combing the intervening wooded and mountainous areas and driving all enemy before them into the trap formed by the NEUSTADT - LANDAU screen.

(4) As a result of operations during the period 25 - 28 March 1945, many casualties were inflicted upon the enemy

and 608 prisoners of war were taken. Lines of communication within the Corps Zone were protected, large quantities of enemy materiel were discovered and safeguarded and all enemy in the Corps rear areas were mopped up. The Group suffered no casualty during this period.

h. At about 1200A, 28 March 1945, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, was alerted for movement on the following day to an assembly area vicinity of LAMPERTHEIM, about 5 kms East of the RHINE RIVER. Quartering parties from all units were dispatched at once. On 29 March 1945, the Group proceeded in one column, crossing the RHINE RIVER through the XV Corps bridgehead at WORMS and closing in its assembly area at 291600A.

i. (1) At 291900A, VOGC XXI Corps were received assigning the following mission to the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz:

"Move immediately and secure Army bridgehead line in indicated zone, coordinating movements with elements of XV Corps now operating therein. Maintain contact with elements 10th Armd Div operating North of NECKAR RIVER. Upon being relieved or passed through by elements of 4th Inf Div, assemble in Corps reserve, prepared for immediate move to protect Corps right (South) flank. Report locations each two hours this headquarters." This mission was later confirmed by Opns Instns No. 54, Headquarters XXI Corps, 30 March 1945. The Seventh Army bridgehead area in the XXI Corps Zone was bounded by the line AMORBACH - MUDAU - REISENBACH - EBERBACH. Co A, 11th Engr (C) Bn was placed in direct support of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz.

(2) At 292400A, the Group moved from its assembly area in two columns, the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, less Troop A, attached 1 Plat Co A, 11th Engr (C) Bn,

on the South, entering the hill masses east of the RHINE RIVER known as the ODENWALD at WEINHEIM, and the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, 1 Plat Co A, 11th Engr (C) Bn atchd, on the North, entering at HEPPEMHEIM. Hq and Hq Tr, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, atchd 1 Plat Tr B, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, 1 Plat Co F and 1 Plat Tr E, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Co A, 11th Engr (C) Bn (-), followed the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz.

(3) Prior to departure from their assembly areas, the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, organized two task forces, each consisting of 1 Rcn Tr reinforced by 1 plat Lt Tanks and 1 Plat AG's, and the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, organized three such forces. As the squadrons moved forward and additional routes became available, task forces were detached from the main bodies and dispatched to their assigned objectives.

(4) The terrain was extremely rugged and all columns were forced to operate almost exclusively in narrow wooded valleys. Enemy resistance was limited to small but determined rear guards who sought to delay the advance of all task forces by means of defended road blocks, destroyed bridges and other obstacles. Enemy air continually harassed all columns throughout the day. Hq and Hq Troop, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, reinforced, left the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, axis at MICHELBACH and formed a sixth task force. This force shot down an enemy ME 109 vicinity of BEERFELDEN.

(5) By late afternoon, 30 March 1945, all units had reached the objective line. Troops were disposed as follows:

Tr C, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz (-):
 OBERDIELBACH
 1 Plat Tr C, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz:
 STRUMPFELBRUNN
 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz (-):
 OBERSCHIEDENTAL

Tr B, 101st Cav Rcn Sq:
 UNTERSCHIEDENTAL
 Hq & Hq Tr, 101st Cav Gp, Mecz, and
 Tr B, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz:
 SCHLOSSAU
 Task Force, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz:
 STEINBACH
 Tr C, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz:
 KIRCHZELL
 Tr A, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz:
 AMORBACH
 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz (-):
 WURZBERG.

(6) As a result of our operations on 30 March 1945, the enemy suffered serious losses in killed and wounded and 244 prisoners of war were taken. The 101st Cav Gp, Mecz, executed its mission and secured the Seventh Army bridgehead line in the XXI Corps Zone. Losses of 5 wounded were sustained by the Group in the day's operation.

j. (1) Prior to nightfall 30 March 1945, motorized elements of the 4th Inf Div reached the 101st Cav Gp, Mecz, front lines and relieved it of responsibility for continued defense of the Seventh Army bridgehead line. On the morning 31 March 1945, Opns Instns No. 55 issued from Headquarters XXI Corps. The 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, was directed to continue its advance to the line HOCHSTADT (excl) - NEUSTADT - ROTHENBERG and to coordinate its advance east of the Corps objective with Rcn elms of the 12th Armored Division operating to the North.

(2) The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, continued to operate in the southern part of the Group Zone and the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, in the northern. A special task force comprised of elements of the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, under the command of Major Robert D. Feagin, Jr., E. O. of that squadron, was formed and operated directly under Headquarters 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, along the axis

GRUNSFELD - IPPERSHEIM - NEUSTADT in the center of the Group Zone. Hq & Hq Tr, 101st Cav Gp, Mecz, atchd 1 Plat Tr B, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, 1 Plat Co F, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, and 1 Plat Tr E 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, formed another task force and operated on the right of Task Force Feagin. All elements of the Group were instructed to proceed aggressively, by-pass enemy resistance where possible and reach the objective line with the least possible delay.

(3) Hq & Hq Tr, 101st Cav Gp, Mecz, reinforced, and Task Force Feagin moved out at about 311200A. Due to the time consumed in transmitting orders to the 101st and 116th Cav Rcn Sqs, Mecz, whose command posts were located at a considerable distance from the Group CP, those units were unable to undertake the new mission until about 311400A. Stiffening enemy resistance was encountered by all elements of the Group. Artillery and nebelwerfer fire were employed by the enemy in the defense of road blocks and demolitions, and full advantage of the defensive character of the terrain was taken to inflict maximum delay. By night 31 March 1945, elements of the Group had reached the line EUBIGHEIM -

BUCH AM HORN - HECKFELD - TAUBERBISHOPSHEIM.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.


a. Lt Col Hubert C. Leonard was returned to duty 12 March 1945 and resumed command of the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz. Major Robert D. Feagin, Jr., reverted to his previous assignment as executive officer of that squadron.

b. Total casualties of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, are: 1 - 31 Total to 31

	March 45	March 45
Killed in Action . .	11	16
Wounded in Action	52	67
Missing in Action	3	6

c. Prisoners of War 1190 1199

d. The 101st and 116th Cav Rcn Sqs, Mecz, were attached to this headquarters throughout the period covered by this report.



CHARLES B. MCCLELLAND
Colonel, Cavalry
Commanding.



MARCH INCLOSURE No. 1

(Operation of 13 - 15 March 1945, resulting in the capture of the towns of GEISLAUTERN, WEHRDEN, SCHAFFHAUSEN, and HOSTENBACH, GERMANY.)

1. General Situation:

a. Elements of XXI Corps occupied positions south and southwest of the SAAR RIVER in the SAAREGUEMINES - FORBACH - WADGASSEN area. Pursuant to Opn Instr. No. 26, XXI Corps, 1 March 1945, 63rd and 70th Inf Divs were attacking in their respective zones and by the morning of 13 March 1945, the

70 Inf Div, on the 101st Cav Gp right, had cleared the city of FORBACH and was entering the towns of STIRING - WENDEL and PETITE ROSSELLE.

b. Elements of the Third Army occupied defensive positions along the south bank of the SAAR RIVER on the 101st Cav Gp left flank.

2. Special Situation:

a. 101st Cav Gp, Mecz, reinforced, occupied defensive positions along the line EMMERSWEILLER - WADGASSEN, GERMANY, both exclusive, and was prepared to attack to the north on Corps order to clear all enemy south and southwest of the SAAR RIVER in zone.

b. Plans previously prepared by Hq 101st Cav Gp assigned Hill 283 and the towns of GEISLAUTERN and WEHRDEN to the 101st Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, Lt Col Milton Kendall, commanding, as objectives. SCHAFFHAUSEN and HOSTENBACH were the assigned objectives of the 116th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, Lt Col Hubert C. Leonard, commanding.

c. (1) Hill 283 was the dominating terrain feature in the Group zone. This hill was protected by elaborate defensive works and dense AT and AP mine fields. Entry into, or possession of, WEHRDEN was impracticable while Hill 283 remained in enemy hands. The approaches to GEISLAUTERN lent themselves to effective defense in depth from strong points located in the houses lining both sides of the single street.

(2) The approach to the town of SCHAFFHAUSEN necessitated movement either by a single road or across gently sloping terrain, both of which were totally devoid of cover or concealment for a distance of more than 1000 meters. Hill 283 also dominated all approaches to that town from the south and east. Enemy defenses consisted of entrenchments, fox-holes, strong points located in houses on the southern fringe of town, and several broad belts of AT and AP mines. The town of HOSTENBACH was dominated by elaborate defensive works on the high ground north of the SAAR RIVER.

d. Information previously obtained from reliable sources, and repeatedly

confirmed by PWs, indicated that the towns of GEISLAUTERN and WEHRDEN were garrisoned by the 2nd Bn, 861 Volksgrenadier Regiment and that the 1st Bn, 861 Volksgrenadier Regiment, occupied the towns of SCHAFFHAUSEN and HOSTENBACH. The total enemy strength in the Group zone was estimated at 800 men, supported by the defensive works on the north bank of the SAAR RIVER.

e. Information obtained from PWs in the late afternoon, 13 March 1945, indicated that the enemy in the 101st Cav Gp zone planned to assemble that night and withdraw to the north bank of the SAAR RIVER.

3. Narrative:

a. At 1800A, 13 March 1945, C. O. 101st Cav Gp Mecz, directed the 101st Cav Rcn Sq to dispatch a strong combat patrol to Hill 283 and another north along the LUDWEILER - GEISLAUTERN road with the mission of gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy. At the same date and hour, the 116th Cav Rcn Sq was directed to send a similar patrol to the town of SCHAFFHAUSEN to determine strength, composition, and dispositions of enemy forces. Both Squadrons were alerted for an early attack.

b. (1) At 2045A, one platoon Tr A, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, 1 squad Co C, 290th Engr (C) Bn atchd, 1st Lt Robert Ulmschneider, commanding, proceeded through the enemy mine fields and defensive works and reached Hill 283 (the patrol objective) undetected, and there held its position for the remainder of the night. The balance of the troop attempted to follow, but was repulsed by strong enemy resistance. The troop commander, Captain Ralph Ritchie, was wounded but refused evacuation. Lt Ulmschneider directed artillery fire during the night on enemy defensive positions vicinity of Hill 283 causing numerous enemy casualties.

(2) At the same hour, one platoon Tr C, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, 1 squad Co C, 290th Engr (C) Bn atchd, Lt Harold Meyer, commanding, advanced down the LUDWEILER - GEISLAUTERN road and successfully negotiated enemy road craters and AT AP mine fields, neutralizing these obstacles as the patrol moved forward. The patrol was stopped by strong enemy MG and mortar fire at the southern edge of GEISLAUTERN and was forced to withdraw to LUDWEILER. The patrol was reinforced by 1 plat Co F, 101st Cav Rcn Sq. Thus strengthened, it resumed its mission, overcame several enemy strong points and entered the town of GEISLAUTERN.

(3) At about 0015B, 14 March 1945, one platoon Tr B, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, 2nd Lt Joseph Borkowski, commanding, proceeded through the dense enemy AT and AP mine fields and defensive works, and entered the town of SCHAFFHAUSEN. Movement therein was made extremely hazardous by the profusion of booby traps and AP mines. At about 0430B, the patrol mission was extended, and the platoon continued through the town of HOSTENBACH and took positions along the south bank of the SAAR RIVER, thus effectively blocking all avenues of escape for the enemy then remaining south of the SAAR RIVER in the 116th Cav Rcn Sq zone. Contact was established with patrols of adjacent units on the Squadron left. The action of this patrol, which accomplished its mission with complete success and without a single casualty, may be attributed to the bold and skillful leadership of Lt Borkowski.

c. At 0730B, 14 March 1945, the 101st Cav Rcn Sq launched a coordinated attack to reduce all enemy resistance south and southwest of the SAAR RIVER in the Squadron zone.

(1) Tr A, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Co F, 101st Cav Rcn Sq (less 1 plat) atchd, Capt

Ralph Ritchie, commanding, attacked astride Hill 283 and, after severe fighting, reached its objective. Capt Ritchie was evacuated after sustaining his third wound in the action and Lt Robert Ulmschneider assumed command of the unit. The success of this attack can be attributed in a large measure to the courageous action of Lt Ulmschneider in directing friendly artillery fire from his position on the shoulder of Hill 283 on enemy forces not more than 100 yards distant from him.

(2) Tr B, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, 1 plat Tr E, 101st Cav Rcn Sq atchd, Capt Abraham Friedman, commanding, attacked in a northeasterly direction on Tr A's right along the heavily wooded south and southeasterly slopes of Hill 283. This unit encountered a well concealed and closely sown enemy schu mine field and, after suffering seven serious casualties within a few minutes, was forced to withdraw and change the direction of its attack. In spite of the density of the mine field, all wounded were successfully evacuated under the personal direction of 1st Lt John M. Sullivan of that unit.

(3) Tr C, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, 1 plat Co F, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, and 1 plat Tr E, 101st Cav Rcn Sq atchd, Capt August Bielss, commanding, attacked mounted along the LUDWEILER - GEISLAUTERN road. Movement was canalized by the nature of the terrain and the troop advanced slowly against determined enemy rear guard action.

(4) By nightfall, 14 March 1945, Trs A and B, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, held all of Hill 283 and Tr C, 101st Cav Rcn Sq had completed the mopping up of GEISLAUTERN.

d. The 116th Cav Rcn Sq quickly and successfully exploited the success of Lt Borkowski's patrol and at about 0500B, 14 March 1945, launched a piece-meal attack

dismounted against the towns of SCHAFFHAUSEN and HOSTENBACH, employing Tr A, Capt Alfred Burgess, commanding, and Tr B, Captain Augustine Littleton, commanding, in the action. The use of armor in this attack was precluded by the heavy mine fields protecting all approaches to the Squadron objectives. Both troops moved quickly to their objectives and by 1300B, mopping up had been completed, the south bank of the SAAR RIVER had been occupied, and contact was established with the 101st Cav Rcn Sq left. Tr C, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Captain Louis Bossert, commanding, was held in reserve until 1900B, at which time it was attached to the 101st Cav Rcn Sq. This attack is particularly noteworthy inasmuch as heavy losses were inflicted upon the enemy, a substantial number of PWs were taken and both objectives seized and held at a cost of one officer wounded.

e. The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Tr C, 116th Cav Rcn Sq atchd, resumed operations at about 0430B, 15 March 1945; and by evening of the same day had cleared the

town of WEHRDEN and eliminated all enemy resistance south of the SAAR RIVER in the Squadron zone. Tr C, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, cleared the critical area vicinity of the WEHRDEN - VOLKLINGEN bridge in the face of particularly heavy observed fire from enemy positions in the town of VOLKLINGEN. Forward elements of all units received heavy machine gun and mortar fire from enemy positions on the north bank throughout the entire operation.

4. Results of Operation:

a. All enemy resistance south and southwest of the SAAR RIVER in the 101st Cav Gp zone eliminated.

b. Towns of GEISLAUTERN, WEHRDEN, SCHAFFHAUSEN and HOSTENBACH captured.

c. Corps front line in Group zone rectified and shortened.

d. Many casualties inflicted upon the enemy and 54 PWs captured.

5. Losses sustained:

2 killed and 31 wounded.



MARCH INCLOSURE No. 2

(Operation 16 - 20 March 1945, resulting in a penetration of the Siegfried Line in the SARREGUEMINES area and the capture of ST. INGBERT, GERMANY.)

1. General Situation:

a. The XXI Corps had launched an attack against the Siegfried Line in the SAAREGUEMINES - FORBACH area, the 63rd Inf Div on the Corps right and the 70th Inf Div on the left. Both divisions were attacking on a broad front and by 16 March, the 63rd Inf Div had made a narrow penetration of the outer belt of fortifications facing the division right.

b. The 70th Inf Div had relieved elements of the 101st Cav Gp Mecz, on the south and southeast bank of the SAAR RIVER and by late afternoon 16 March 1945, was making preparations to attempt a crossing on the following day.

2. Special Situation:

a. Pursuant to Opns Instr Nos. 37 and 39, Hq XXI Corps, 15 and 16 March 1945, elements of the 101st Cav Gp Mecz, had

assembled piecemeal vicinity of HELLMER, FRANCE, the 116th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, closing at 1300A, 16 March 1945, and the balance of the Group at 1100A, 17 March 1945. Elements of the Group were attached to the 63rd Inf Div as they arrived at the assembly area, but all reverted to Group control at 171430B. The 101st Cav Gp Mecz, in its entirety was then attached to that division.

b. The 93rd Armored Field Artillery (105 mm) was attached to the 101st Cav Gp Mecz.

c. In accordance with VOGC 63rd Inf Div, the 101st Cav Gp Mecz, relieved the 253rd Inf, the left regiment of the 63rd Inf Div, along the general line ENSHEIM - GUDINGEN, both Germany, at 2103B, 17 March 1945, with the mission to defend present positions and to maintain contact with the enemy by aggressive patrolling. Co K, 253rd Inf, and 63rd Cav Rcn Trp (-) were attached in position to the Group. Command Posts were established as follows:

101st Cavalry Group:
WINTRINGERHOF, GERMANY,

101st Cav Rcn Sq:
ESCHRINGEN, GERMANY,

116th Cav Rcn Sq:
BUBINGEN, GERMANY,

93rd AFA Bn:
KLEIN-BLITTERSDORF, GERMANY.

Contact with adjacent units was established without delay.

d. The enemy enjoyed excellent observation of all terrain to his front from positions in the Siegfried Line. That portion of the Group front occupied by the 101st Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, was particularly exposed to observed enemy fire.

3. Narrative:

a. Aggressive patrolling to the front

and laterally was conducted by all elements of the Group on 18 - 19 March 1945, and close observation of enemy positions in the Siegfried Line was maintained throughout the period. Front line elements were subjected to a substantial amount of enemy fire of all calibers and several casualties were sustained.

b. At 191505A, G-2 63rd Inf Div, reported that indications of the withdrawal of the 17th SS Panzer Div. had been noted, and requested prompt information regarding other indications of enemy withdrawal in the Group zone. Between 191530A and 200415A, the following enemy activity was observed by forward patrols and promptly reported to Division.

1530A "Enemy mtcyl messenger observed going from pillbox to pillbox vicinity 5270".

1610A "5 enemy observed picking up telephone wire at 50456920.

1613A "Heavy dust cloud indicating vehicular column moving west from 495690. Number of vehicles not visible."

1620A "Above column turned north at 495692".

1640A "2nd column observed following route of column reported in messages of 1613A and 1620A".

1654A "2 enemy observed leaving pillbox and entering house at 496683".

1900A "15-20 enemy observed entering houses vicinity of 39836795 and leaving with overcoats".

2055A "Sound of movement of track laying vehicles heard vicinity of 522688".

2245A "Sound of movement of track laying vehicles heard moving NW of Co F position".

2315A "Sound of movement of track laying vehicles moving NW again heard from Co F position".

0415A "Vehicular movement heard on trail leading over ridge just north of 530690".

In each of the above instances, artil-

lery fire was brought down upon the enemy with excellent results.

c. In the late afternoon, 19 March 1945, while orders were being issued by the Troop Commander to effect a change in mission, the enemy laid down a concentration of mortar fire on the CP of the 63rd Cav Rcn Tr Mecz, virtually eliminating the command element of the troop. The troop commander, one 1st lieutenant, the 1st sergeant and two platoon sergeants were killed. Two other officers and several non-commissioned officers were wounded. In this emergency, Capt Howard R. Bissland, Liaison Officer, Hq 101st Cav Gp Mecz, was relieved of duty with the Group and placed in command of the 63rd Cav Rcn Tr Mecz.

d. At 200730A, C. O. 101st Cav Gp Mecz, directed both Squadrons to initiate vigorous reconnaissance to maintain contact with the enemy and to determine present disposition, attitude, and strength in the Group zone. A reconnaissance in force was initiated by both Squadrons in their respective zones, their front lines being outposted by small detachments. The Group was alerted for forward displacement. Co K, 253rd Inf, and 63rd Cav Rcn Tr Mecz, were detached from the Group.

e. Due to enemy demolitions, road blocks, and mine fields, mounted reconnaissance was impossible and all units moved forward on foot, by-passing or clearing obstacles according to spot conditions. Vehicles were brought forward as road blocks and craters were eliminated, gaps in mine fields cleared, dragon's teeth blown, and stream crossings improvised. Little enemy resistance was encountered and many of the principal defensive works of the Siegfried Line were found to be ungarrisoned. Troop C and Company F, 101st Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, moved through the main fortifications of

the Siegfried Line and occupied the town of BISCHMISCHEIM, 1st Lt. Lewis A. R. Innerarity, Jr., Tr C, 116th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, was killed by an enemy mine.

f. At 201000A, Tr A, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, atchd 1 platoon Tr E and 1 platoon Co F, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, Captain Alfred Burgess, commanding, was detached from the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, and placed under direct control of Hq 101st Cav Gp, Mecz. In accordance with VOGC 63rd Inf Div, C. O. 101st Cav Gp, Mecz, directed Tr A reinforced, to move rapidly to the division right flank and proceed by any available routes through the main fortifications of the Siegfried Line, capture ST. INGBERT, and block the roads to the west and southwest of that town. The mission was boldly and skillfully executed and the town was entered at 201535A against light enemy resistance. The town was cleared of enemy at 201740A and Tr A, reinforced, was relieved by elements of the 63rd Inf Div.





g. At 201030A, the 101st Cav Gp Mecz, received the mission to sweep the area BREBACH - RENTRISCH - ENSHEIM - ST. INGBERT and to protect the west flank of the 63rd Inf Div. The sweeping mission was completed by 2135A. Only light enemy resistance was encountered. The Group was relieved of its responsibility for the division west flank at 202359A.

h. Upon relief by elements of the 63rd Inf Div at ST. INGBERT, Tr A, 116th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, reinforced, was directed to screen the division left flank along the BREBACH - ST. INGBERT road and to extend reconnaissance 2 kms to the west and northwest. Contact was made with a dismounted patrol of Tr B, 116th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, at 1915A and the screen was completely established by 2125A.

i. The 101st Cav Gp Mecz, was released from control of the 63rd Inf Div at 202359A and reverted to XXI Corps at

that date and hour. The 101st Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, assembled at ESHRENGEN and the 116th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, at BUBINGEN. The 93rd AFA Bn was relieved of attachment to the 101st Cav Gp Mecz, at 210600A.

4. Results of Operation:

a. Occupied and defended positions facing Siegfried Line from ENSHEIM to GUDINGEN, GERMANY, from 16 - 20 March 1945.

b. Swept zone BREBACH - RENTRISCH - ENSHEIM - ST. INGBERT.

c. Made first complete passage through the Siegfried Line in Seventh Army Sector and captured ST. INGBERT.

d. Inflicted many casualties upon the enemy and captured 104 PWs.

5. Losses sustained:

3 killed and 11 wounded (exclusive of those suffered by 63rd Cav Rcn Tr Mecz).

April



The first day of April dawned beautifully. It was Easter Sunday. The Group moved forward in several columns meeting little resistance until they reached the west bank of the TAUBER RIVER. Suddenly the enemy lashed out with every weapon at his disposal. He was dug-in along the high ground east of the river. Crossings were made under a canopy of "Screaming Meemee's" (Nebelwerfer fire) which exploded in great clouds of smoke pierced by thousands of fragments from the size of a pinhead to large gouging chunks. Jet propelled planes which appeared to move faster than their new and peculiar roaring sound now took up the attack. They bombed and strafed, coming back again and again, until the nerve centers of each and every man were reacting on a split-second basis as animal instinct thrust aside the slower moving processes of reason. The columns finally pushed ahead and engaged the enemy on his own ground. Thus, the curtain rose most prophetically on the month of April.

Fighting Becomes Savage

Fighting in the territory between the TAUBER and DANUBE RIVERS grew in intensity as the Germans began to stand their ground and to resist with the utmost determination. Progress was steady but there were places where three and four days of constant attack were needed to breakdown resistance. The savagery of these encounters rose to a peak at the town of MERKENDORF where the SS made a night counterattack. They overwhelmed the friendly outposts, which fought to the last man and then they came in screaming, "SS", as their battle cry. The fight soon became a "knockdown and dragout" between individuals inside pitch dark rooms, on the streets and in the back alleys. And, man for man, they were beaten thoroughly. Among other casualties, the SS lost eighty men killed to two cavalymen killed. Not bad for men recently civilians against men born and bred to kill even their own, which they did, women included, in towns along the line of advance where the people considered further resistance foolhardy.

Enemy Thrown Off Balance

Thrusting through the outer-shell of resistance the columns finally threw the enemy off balance and then proceeded to keep him off balance. Roadblocks and barricades were found constantly in reduced stages of construction. Demolitions work, with few exceptions, was faulty and otherwise ineffectual. The bridge across the DANUBE RIVER at DILLINGEN was taken undamaged by the 12th Armored

Division to which the Group had become attached several days earlier. The Cavalry crossed to the South shore ahead of the Division on the morning of the 24th of April ... and the race southward was on!

Outstanding Tactical Operation


One of the forward units fired on an enemy officer courier who, apparently unhurt, abandoned his vehicle and escaped in the woods. Official maps and documents found in his dispatch case revealed the enemy's plans for a counterattack against units on the group's right flank. It was discovered that a key highway along the Mindel River was being used by the enemy as a boundary between units and therefore it offered possibilities for swift penetration. This assumption proved correct and the Cavalry proceeded to spearhead the 12th Armored deep into enemy territory, cutting the 13th SS Korps main supply routes; seizing bridges over the WERTACH RIVER; generally disorganizing enemy communications and other rear installations and, finally, causing the SS to breakoff their counterattack and withdraw in confusion. This was one of the outstanding tactical operations of the war on the Seventh Army front and the part played by the Mechanized Cavalrymen was a magnificent demonstration of their true worth in modern combat.

Resistance Collapses

The Group's movement forward was so swift that complete surprise was achieved time and again. Enemy airports with hundreds of planes were captured intact, including the "Jets" which had harrassed every step of the way for days past. One could almost "feel" the moment when the heart went out of the opposing troops. The utter collapse of the German units came more as an anti-climax than as a surprise. Prisoner of War pens began to bulge with men. Some were downcast and others were happy just to be alive. Thousands more began to pour back along every road.

What Price Intolerance?

Dejected as they were the German PW's did not have that horrible hopeless look in their eyes or the haunted slouch which characterized the released men and women of the Nazi Concentration Camps seen a few days earlier. The picture of these pitiful people in their blue and white striped sackcloth uniforms, which accentuated their protruding bones, was etched deeply into the minds of all who saw them. The Cavalry had released some 2400 Jews who had been herded into a freight train near LANDSBURG, the small city where Hitler wrote his "Mein Kampf" while in prison. The LANDSBURG Concentration Camp was captured too late to save the hundreds of Jews whose charred and emaciated bodies were strewn about like parchment covered Gargoyles in the still smouldering ruins of their prison barracks. Those who did not know what they were fighting for now knew, at least, what they were fighting against. What price intolerance?



Merkendorf . . . the CP door was blown in with panzerfaust fire and then they came through the windows screaming, "SS" . . . the darkened room lighted momentarily from the muzzle blast of a roaring "grease gun" . . .

“Oora Americanetz!”

For weeks the Cavalry had been passing small roving groups of slave laborers, released Allied soldiers captured by the Germans and other displaced persons. Now these people were about by the thousands, like driftwood on a storm ridden beach, with only one thing on their minds ... looting for food and clothing. Sympathy was on their side but the need for controlled sanitation, order and discipline dictated firm measures which were carried out as kindly as possible. The mixture of tongues and races is almost indescribable and greatly complicated the work of control. One young officer faced with a situation getting completely out of hand ordered a Caliber .50 Machine Gun fired overhead whereupon the looters rushed to the curbstones and cheered. ... “Oora Americanetz!” Thus, in the words of that young officer, “Now, I ask YOU?”

“Those Crazy Cavalrymen”

April proved to be the most highly concentrated period of fighting which the Cavalrymen of the 101st Group were to face throughout the campaigns in which they participated. When they were not actually exchanging fire with the enemy they were constantly pushing forward into and behind his lines, holing-up at nights in towns and villages with the nearest friendly units often from 20 to 50 kilometers to their rear. There is no praise too high for the men who rode the point “Jeeps” and Armored Cars and for those who carried the assault forward and through unending miles of resistance. The respect of the doughboys, the men of the Heavy Armor and other forward units for “those crazy cavalrymen” was sincere and unmistakable.

All Earned Battle Stars

The men who rode and drove the gasoline and other supply trucks night and day and who never once let their units down regardless of sniper fire and constant threat of ambush may well be proud of their achievement. Even the so-called “pencil pushers” whose work was less spectacular but no less important lived these fateful days of April in constant danger and at times under direct attack. They too are entitled to their battle stars. And over-all stands the leadership which “called the shots” accurately and unerringly and thereby provided the spark of determination which consolidated all effort into an outstanding achievement at arms.



HEADQUARTERS
101st Cavalry Group, Mecz
APO 758, U. S. Army

21 June 1945.

SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy, Reports After.

TO: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

THRU: Command Channels.

1. In accordance with the provisions of AR 345 - 105, dated 18 November 1929, and Change 4, dated 10 August 1944; letter Hq ETOUSA, subj: "Handling of Historical Documents in the European Theater of Operations", file AG 312.1 Op History, dated 14 July 1944, and Section IV, Circular No. 34, Headquarters Seventh Army, dated 28 November 1944, the following report is submitted.

2.(*) The inclosed reports and journals with supporting documents constitute the historical records of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., for the period 1 April 1945 - 30 April 1945.


3. During the period covered by this report, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, was commanded by Colonel Charles B. McClelland, with Lt Col Leo W. Mortenson as Executive Officer.

4. Composition:

There was no permanent change in the composition of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., from that noted in Unit History for the period 1 January 1945 to 2 February 1945. The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz., was detached for special operations on two occasions but in both instances, returned to Group control when the operations had been completed. Attachments and detachments are noted below. The 92nd Cav Rcn Sq Mecz., was attached to the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., from 17 April

* Not included herein.

MAP VIII



MAP

Showing Area of Opns
101st Cav Gp (Mec)
1 Apr — 7 Apr 1945

through the close of the period and the 3+2nd Armored Field Artillery Bn, was attached or in direct support from 14 April through the end of the month. Other attachments and detachments are noted as they occurred.

5. Narrative History:

a. (1) The XXI Corps, comprised of the 4th and 42nd Infantry Divisions, the 12th Armored Division, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, and other Corps troops, had crossed the RHINE RIVER 29 March 1945, and was moving rapidly east with the mission of seizing WURZBURG, and crossings over the MAIN RIVER south of that point.

(2) The 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, was deployed along the line EUBIGHEIM - BUCH am HORN - HECKFELD - TAUBERBISCHOFSSHEIM at the close of operations 31 March 1945, with the mission of continuing its advance to the line HOCHSTADT - NEUSTADT - ROTHENBERG in a zone about 25 kms wide. The central axis of the Group zone was GRUNSFELD - IPPERSHEIM - NEUSTADT. All elements had been encountering stiffening enemy resistance on 30 - 31 March 1945.

b. (1) The 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, moved forward on a broad front at first light 1 April 1945. Determined enemy resistance was encountered along the line UNTER-SCHUPF - BECKSTEIN - OBERLAUDA - STEINBACH - DITTENHEIM.

(2) Troop A, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, operating in the extreme northern part of the Group zone, by-passed enemy resistance en route and by 011300A, had reached GIEBELSTADT. It was ordered to remain in position pending developments in the central and southern portions of the Group zone.


(3) Task Force Feagin, comprised of Tr B, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, (-), 1 Plat each of Tr E and Co F, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, moved through TAUBERBISCHOFSSHEIM against light resistance and, after crossing the TAUBER RIVER,

turned south on the east bank against very strong opposition. Hq and Hq Tr, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, attached 1 Plat Tr B, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, and 1 Plat each of Tr E and Co F, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, pushed through to LAUDA but was halted at that point by heavy enemy automatic weapon, small arms, and nebelwerfer fire from the high ground east of the TAUBER RIVER. A heavy fire fight ensued. The combined pressure of Task Force Feagin from the north, and the fire power of Hq and Hq Tr, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, reinforced, drove the enemy off the forward slopes facing LAUDA, enabling the latter to cross the TAUBER RIVER rapidly and move north on the east bank. A junction with Task Force Feagin was made at DISTELHAUSEN and the Group CP was established in that town.

(4) Task Force Feagin, followed by the balance of the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, (less Troop A), which had crossed the TAUBER RIVER at TAUBERBISCHOFSSHEIM, turned east at DISTELHAUSEN and proceeded to GRUNSFELD. By night, reconnaissance against very strong enemy resistance had been extended by the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, to ZIMMERN.

(5) The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, less Tr A, advanced rapidly against scattered enemy resistance to the line DAINBACK - UNTERSCHAUPF - HECKFELD, but encountered very strong enemy resistance on the high ground west of BAD MERGENTHEIM. At 011600 C.O. 101st Cav Gp, Mecz, directed the Squadron to discontinue reconnaissance

MAP IX



MAP
Showing Area of Ops
101st Cav Gp (Mec)
8 Apr - 13 Apr 1945

in its assigned zone and assemble at TAUBERBISCHOFSEHEIM.

(6) At 011445A, the following VOGG XXI Corps was received at DISTELHAUSEN:

"Relieved of mission assigned in OI 55, this headquarters, atchd 4th Inf Div effective at once. Establish liaison with 4th Inf Div at once. Assemble as directed by CG 4th Inf Div."

These orders were confirmed later by Opns Instns No. 56, Headquarters XXI Corps, 1 April 1945. Liaison was established promptly with the 4th Infantry Division at WELDURN.

(7) Enemy air harrassed all elements of the Group throughout the day.

(8) As a result of operations on 31 March - 1 April 1945, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, advanced more than 30 kms against varying degrees of enemy resistance, determined the contour of the enemy MLR along the line BAD MERGENTHEIM - GERLACHSHEIM - GRUNSFELD - ZIMMERN - VILCHBAND, inflicted many casualties on the enemy and captured 426 prisoners of war. Losses sustained were 4 killed, 7 wounded and 1 missing.

c. (1) As prescribed in Opns Memo No. 74, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, 1 April 1945, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, was directed to screen the division front along the general line SINDOLSHEIM - BOXBERG - BAD MERGENTHEIM - OCHENSFURT, a straight line distance of approximately 55 kms. It was further directed to gain and maintain contact with the 63rd Infantry Division then moving east in the VI Corps zone south of the line SINDOLSHEIM - BOXBERG - BAD MERGENTHEIM.

(2) The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, (less Tr A) was assigned the screening mission along the line SINDOLSHEIM - BOXBERG - TAUBER RIVER vic BAD MERGENTHEIM. The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was given the remainder of the line extending from TAUBER RIVER vic BAD MERGENTHEIM to OCHENSFURT. Command posts were established as follows:

101st Cavalry Group, Mecz:
DISTELHAUSEN,

101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz:
KUPPRICHHAUSEN,

116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz:
ZIMMERN.

(3) On 2 April 1945, the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, deployed along its assigned line again meeting determined resistance west of BAD MERGENTHEIM. Task Force Feagin dissolved and its elements reverted to the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz. Tr A, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, atchd 1 Plat Tr E, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was assigned the northeastern $\frac{1}{4}$ of the Squadron line and deployed without incident. Tr B, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, atchd 1 Plat Tr E, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, on Tr A's right, assumed its position in the center of the Squadron line against light resistance. Tr C, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, atchd 1 Plat from each of Tr E, and Co F, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, attempted to penetrate the east flank of the enemy MLR defined in paragraph b (8) above and entered the outskirts of OSFELD at 021100B. They were met with fierce enemy resistance and received heavy automatic weapon, small arms, panzerfaust, mortar, artillery, and nebelwerfer fire. After a hard battle, the troop was forced to retire to positions on the high ground south of VILCHBAND. Elements of the 22nd Infantry Rgt of the 4th Infantry Division moved up on the

right of Tr C, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, and both units maintained contact with the enemy throughout the night.

(4) (a) Tr C, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was further reinforced by the attachment of 2 Plats Tr E, and 2 Plats Co F, both of the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, and resumed the attack on OSFELD early 3 April 1945. The troop again succeeding in breaking through the outer defenses of the town and entered the northern outskirts at about 1000B. After fighting fiercely throughout the day, it was again forced to retire to the heights south of VILCHBAND. During the course of the day, 75 prisoners of war were taken by Tr C, reinforced, and a conservative estimate placed enemy dead at more than 100. Elements of the 22nd Infantry on the right of Tr C, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, attacked enemy positions on the high ground east of the TAUBER RIVER but were unable to make any appreciable progress. Trs A and B, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, patrolled aggressively to the south and southeast of the screening line. Tr A met determined enemy resistance vic of GELSCEHEIM and Tr B gained and maintained contact with the enemy vic of SIMMRINGEN. The patrol and combat activities of all elements of the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, on 3 April, disclosed the exact contour of the enemy MLR from GERLACHSHEIM to GULCHHEIM and forced him to reveal the presence of artillery, mortars and anti-tank weapons in support of his well dug-in front line positions.

(b) The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, continued aggressive patrolling south of the screening line and maintained contact with the enemy vic of BAD MERGENTHEIM. Contact was established with elements of the 117th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, which was moving east in the VI Corps zone south of the screening line.

(5) (a) On 4 April 1945, CG, 4th Infantry Division ordered a coordinated attack against enemy positions in the KONIGSHOFEN - OSFELD - LOEFFELSTEIZEN area, employing the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, CT 12 and CT 22, each of the latter reinforced by elements of 70th Tank Bn (m), the 610th TD Bn and the 99th Cml Bn. The boundary between CT 22 on the right and CT 12 was the line MESSELHAUSEN - OBERBALBACH - BAD MERGENTHEIM, the LD, the front lines of CT 22 and the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, then located along the general line SIMMRINGEN - VILCHBAND - KUTZBRUNN - MARBACH. Both CTs were directed to attack to the south and southwest in their respective zones. Tr C, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was ordered to continue the attack on OSFELD until passed through by elements of CT 12. Tr B 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, received the mission of containing the enemy vic of SIMMRINGEN until elements of CT 12 had passed through its front lines. When this passage had been effected, both troops were to protect the left flank of the two combat teams. Tr A, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was directed to maintain a counter reconnaissance screen between Tr B's left vic of SIMMRINGEN and CT 8, 4th Infantry Division, at OCHSENFURT.

(b) The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, (-) was directed to continue its screening mission west of the TAUBER RIVER until masked by elements of the VI Corps, and to assemble in division reserve vic of KUPPRICHHAUSEN when this had taken place.

(6) The attack continued through the 4th, 5th, and 6th of April. Due to the extremely difficult terrain and the strength of enemy resistance, progress was slow and by night 6 April, our forward elements had reached the line UNTERBALBACH - HARTHAUSEN. At

061200B, Tr C, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was relieved of its combat mission and directed to assemble vic of SACHSENHEIM. Tr B, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, remained in the vic of SIMMRINGEN and protected the left flank of the attacking CTs. Tr A, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, continued to maintain the counter-reconnaissance screen described in paragraph c (5) (a) above.

(7) Early 6 April, the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, (-) was directed to extend its reconnaissance to the high ground west and southwest of BAD MERGENTHEIM, and to continue to screen the TAUBER RIVER valley north of that city. Tr B, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, pushed strong patrols into the assigned area, and by night it was determined that the enemy continued his occupation of that area in great strength. Tr C, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, executed the screening mission in the TAUBER RIVER valley.

(8) Pursuant to FO 79, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, 7 April 1945, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, (less Tr C, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz) was relieved of all other missions and directed to conduct a reconnaissance in force to the southeast and destroy all enemy north and northwest of the line GELCHSHEIM-GNODSTADT. Tr C, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was attached to CT 22 for operations. Elements of the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, moved rapidly to the objective line against light enemy resistance and maintained contact with enemy forces at BALDERSHEIM, OLLINGEN, and GEISSLINGEN. The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, assembled in Group reserve vic of SACHSENHEIM. Command posts were established as follows:

101st Cavalry Group, Mecz:
GELCHSHEIM,

101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz:
SACHSENHEIM,



116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz:
GELCHSHEIM.

((9) During the operations 2 - 7 April, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, determined the contour of the enemy MLR in the southern sector of the Corps zone, screened the 4th Infantry Division during its operations in the BAD MERGENTHEIM area, assisted it to penetrate the enemy MLR, inflicted very heavy casualties upon the enemy and captured 559 prisoners of war. Casualties of 5 killed, 14 wounded, and 4 missing were suffered by elements of the Group.

d. (1) At 0800B, 8 April 1945, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, was relieved of attachment to the 4th Infantry Division and attached to the 12th Armored Division. The 4th Infantry Division, continued its attack along the high ground east of the TAUBER RIVER. Pursuant to Opns Instns No. 36, Headquarters 12th Armored Division, 072100B, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, was directed to initiate a reconnaissance in force starting at 081200B in the zone: West boundary SCHAFTERSHEIM - UNTER-OSTHEIM; East boundary OBERNBRIET - LENKERSHEIM to a limiting line along the high ground southeast of the AISCH

RIVER. The Group was reinforced by Co A, 23rd Tank Bn (M) and the 495 Armored Field Artillery Bn was placed in direct support. The 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, operated in a contiguous zone on the Group left.

(2) The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, (-), attached 1 plat Co A, 23rd Tank Bn (M), operated on the right (west) portion of the Group zone, and the 116 Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, attached Co A, 23rd Tank Bn (M), less 1 plat, on the left. Both Squadrons moved forward against determined enemy resistance and by night 8 April, the 101st Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, had reached the TAUBER and GOLLACH RIVER lines in its zone. All bridges over the TAUBER RIVER had been destroyed. The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was unable to reach the GOLLACH RIVER in its zone and halted for the night along the line GULCHSHEIM-RODHEIM-HERRNBERCHTHEIM - IPPESHEIM.

(3) Both Squadrons resumed operations early 9 April. Troop B, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, forded the TAUBER RIVER vicinity of TAUBERRETERSHEIM and penetrated about 2 kms southeast into the enemy's defensive positions in that area against strong resistance and gained Hill 394. Troop C, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, exerted pressure on enemy holding forces at BURGERROTH and BALDERSHEIM but was unable to move forward. After overcoming stiff enemy resistance, elements of the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, cleared the towns of GULCHSHEIM, RODHEIM, and HERRNBERCHTHEIM.

(4) Based on the very determined resistance encountered by all elements of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, and by the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, on the Group's left, coupled with PW reports and other indications, CG, 12th Armored Division decided to commit CC-B and CC-R. Opns Instns No. 38, 12th Armored Division issued at 091600B, April 1945. CC-R was

directed to attack in the direction IPPESHEIM - WEIGENSHEIM - PFAFFENHOFEN - GATTENHOFFEN and thence northwest, destroying the enemy in zone of 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz. CC-B was directed to execute a similar penetration and encircling maneuver in the zone of the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz. The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was ordered to assemble vicinity of GEISSLINGEN prepared to follow CC-R through the gap and continue on the reconnaissance mission to the limiting line. The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was directed to continue to exert maximum pressure against the enemy defending along the GOLLACH RIVER line.

(5) The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, withdrew from its positions along the TAUBER RIVER and moved promptly to its assembly area vicinity of GEISSLINGEN. The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, continued to press to the south and by night 9 April 1945, was attacking AUB, LIPPRICHHAUSEN, and GECKENHEIM. During the night 9 - 10 April, the enemy counter-attacked at GULCHSHEIM and OLLINGIN but was beaten off after inflicting minor damage to materiel.

(6) On the morning of 10 April, CC-R launched its attack but was stopped at IPPESHEIM by fierce resistance from the town and enemy positions in the wooded hills to the east. The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, continued its attack throughout the day but made no appreciable gains. Combat patrols maintained contact with the enemy throughout the night. The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, moved to a forward assembly position vicinity of HERRNBERCHTHEIM.

(7) (a) All elements renewed the attack at first light 11 April, the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, moving forward and protecting the left flank of CC-R as it broke through at IPPESHEIM and moved southeast against continued strong resistance.

Friendly Infantry relieved elements of the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, at BALDERSHEIM and AUB. The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, continued to exert pressure on enemy positions north of the GOL-LACH RIVER.

(b) At 1000B, C. O., 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, ordered a coordinated attack against GOLLHOFEN, which town blocked the principal north-south axis in the Group zone. Troop C, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, attached 1 plat each of Troop E, and Co F, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, and 1 plat Co A, 23rd Tank Bn (M), attacked from the northwest. Co F, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, attached 1 plat Troop B, and 2 plats TRE, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, and 1 plat Co A, 23rd Tank Bn (M), attacked from the northeast. Enemy resistance was most determined. By 1600B, Troop C, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, reinforced, had reached the northern outskirts of the town. Entry into the town from the northeast was blocked by destroyed bridges, and C. O. Co F, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, moved the platoon of Troop B, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, and a part of his tanks to the Northwestern approaches, to aid in the attack from that direction meanwhile maintaining a base of fire from the northeast with the remainder of his force. By 1830B, Troop C, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, reinforced, together with elements of the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, had reached the center of the town in spite of increasing enemy resistance. At that hour, it was determined that the force at hand would be unable to hold the town throughout the night, and all units were successfully withdrawn before dark.

(c) The command post of the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, at GECKENHEIM was raided by enemy tanks during the night 11 - 12 April. After severe fighting in the dark, the attack was beaten off without loss. The command post was


raided again at dawn by enemy jet propelled planes, several bombs were dropped and the town was strafed. One man was killed.

(8) (a) The attack was resumed by all elements early 12 April. CC-R had broken the hard core of enemy resistance on its axis and moved rapidly south through NEUHERBERG and MORLBACH and then turned west and northwest through REICHARDROTH and EQUARHOFEN.

(b) The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, moved south on the left flank of CC-R until it turned west at MORLBACH and then resumed its zone reconnaissance mission, as outlined in par 3 d (4) above, against severe enemy resistance. By dark, advance elements had reached the general line BURGBERNHEIM (excl.) - OTTENHOFEN (excl.) - WIEBELSHEIM (incl.), but were withdrawn to BUCHHEIM for the night. By-passed enemy groups harassed the Squadron supply route vicinity of RUDOLZHOFEN.

(c) The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, launched fresh attacks against the enemy to its front who still defended tenaciously. By 1400B, GOLLHOFEN, LIPPRICH-HAUSEN and HEMMERSHEIM had been captured. Liaison with elements of CC-R was effected at 1530B. A combat patrol of Troop C penetrated to within 400 yards of UFFENHEIM, but was driven off at dark by enemy small arms, mortar and panzerfaust fire. The patrol reported that UFFENHEIM was still held strongly and that much vehicular activity had been observed in and about the town. Reports from OPs manned by Troops A and B indicated that the enemy in the pocket formed by CC-R and the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, were withdrawing east toward UFFENHEIM. Harrassing and interdicting artillery fire was placed on the town and surrounding road net throughout the night.

(9) (a) At first light 13 April, the 101st



Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, continued aggressive reconnaissance to the southeast against stiff enemy resistance. At 1050B, forward elements reported a concentration of enemy self-propelled guns and tanks at ILLESHEIM and a camouflaged air field in that vicinity. The Squadron command element and reserve were attacked in force vicinity of PFAFFENHOFEN by 2 companies of enemy infantry supported by Mark V tanks and self-propelled guns. The attacking force was driven off with minor losses to the Squadron. The enemy infantry suffered heavy casualties, one Mark V tank and four self-propelled guns were destroyed. By dark, forward elements were disposed along the line BURGBERNHEIM - WINDSHEIM, both excl. Fierce enemy resistance made further progress impossible. Contact with the enemy was maintained during the night.

(b) The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, moved rapidly southeast in its zone to the line ADELSHOFEN - STEINACH, but was unable to penetrate enemy defenses beyond that line. Troop A, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, fought its way into

ADELSHOFEN but was forced to withdraw. Troop B, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was repulsed in every effort to by-pass enemy resistance at STEINACH.


(c) At 0830B, a representative of the Burgermeister of UFFENHEIM reported that the enemy garrison at that town had retreated at 0300B, and elements of Troop C, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, entered the town at once. Hq and Hq Tr, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, moved its CP from OBER-ICKELSHEIM to UFFENHEIM, occupying the town at 1100A.

(10) During the operations 8-13 April, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, reconnoitered a zone 30 kms wide to a depth of 25 kms in the face of determined and often fierce enemy resistance, outlined the contour of the enemy's MLR along the line ADELSHOFEN - STEINACH - BURGBERNHEIM - WINDSHEIM, inflicted many casualties upon the enemy, destroyed important quantities of his materiel and captured 384 prisoners of war. Losses sustained were 5 killed, 21 wounded. None was missing.

e. (1) At 2300B, 13 April 1945, verbal orders were received through CG 12th Armored Division relieving the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, from attachment to the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, and attaching it to the 4th Infantry Division, such attachment to become effective at 140600B April. (See Inclosure No. 1 for account of 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, during period 14 - 19 April 1945.)

(2) (a) In accordance with Opns Instns No. 39, Headquarters 12th Armored Division, 140400B April 1945, all elements of the division and attached troops were alerted to exploit on 3 hours notice beginning 140600B in the zone: West boundary Highway 13 (UFFENHEIM - ANSBACH - GUNZENHAUSEN - WEISENBERG); east boundary - Highway 8 (LANGENFELD - NEUSTADT an der AISCH - LANGENZENN) to SEUKEN-

MAP XI



MAP

Showing Area of Opns
101st Cav Gp (Mecz)
18 Apr — 19 Apr 1945



DORF thence by passing NURNBERG to the west and south via KORNBERG and FEUCHT and thence south on the autobahn to HILPOSTEIN.

(b) CC-B followed by CC-A was directed to move south on the axis along the east boundary. CC-R followed by the division command group was ordered to operate on the axis along the west boundary. The 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, (less 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, and Troop B, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz) attached 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, (less 2 rcn tr), 342nd Armored Field Artillery Bn, and 2 plats med tanks, 43rd Tank Bn, was directed to move in the zone between the axis of CC-B and CC-R to the objective line ELLINGEN - HILPOSTEIN and to destroy all enemy encountered. Upon reaching the objective line, the Group was to be prepared to continue the attack to the southeast or to attack to the north or south on division order. All elements of the division and attached troops were directed to report their arrival on Phase Line No 1, Highway 14 (ANSBACH - NURNBERG road). Troop B, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was attached to CC-R of the 12th Armored Division (for account of Tr B 116th Cav Rcn Sq for period 14 - 20 April, see Incl. No. 2).

(c) The 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, moved forward in its zone with Squadrons abreast, the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, on the right and the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, on the left. In order to avoid conflict with the Combat Commands, the main effort of both Squadrons was directed to the center of the Group zone.

(3) (a) The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, displaced east to its new zone and at 1000B, moved southeast on its mission. No serious resistance was encountered north of the AISCH RIVER but, on reaching that obstacle, all bridges were found to have been destroyed. After a detailed reconnaissance of the stream,

elements of the Squadron crossed at 1700B via a ford vicinity of LENKERSHEIM and by a bridge vicinity of IPPESHEIM which had been repaired by civilian labor. Reconnaissance was pushed forward in the assigned zone against small arms and automatic weapons fire from the high ground southeast of the river. At dark forward elements had reached WEIMERSHEIM and ICKELSHEIM but were withdrawn to LENKERSHEIM for the night.

(b) As there was no suitable crossing in the zone of the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, Troops A and D of that organization crossed via the bridge at IPPESHEIM. During the crossing, the enemy counterattacked from the high ground 1 km to the southeast, but were beaten off at 1940B with a loss to the enemy of one tank destroyed and two damaged. The advance continued against scattered enemy resistance from positions on the high ground to the front and the Squadron assembled at OBERNDORF for the night.

(c) Hq and Hq Tr, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, moved from UFFENHEIM to HUMPRECHTSAU.

(4) Both Squadron resumed the attack at daylight 14 April meeting determined resistance along the line WEIMERSHEIM - ICKELSHEIM.

(a) At 1300B, Troop A, 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, forced an opening in the enemy defense north of WEIMERSHEIM and pushed boldly through the wooded areas capturing LINDEN at 1530B after a stiff fight. Other elements of the Squadron followed.

(b) The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was unable to penetrate the enemy defenses on the high ground NE of ICKELSHEIM and at 1700B disengaged and passed through the gap opened by the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, north of WEIMERSHEIM.

(c) Both Squadrons moved rapidly southeast against light resistance and by night were disposed along the north bank of the ZINN RIVER, elements of the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, at TRAUTSKIRCHEN and elements of the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, at ALT-SELINGSBACH and ALT-ZIEGENRUC.

(d) Hq and Hq Tr, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, moved from HUMP-RECHTSAU to WINDSHEIM and thence to LENKERSHEIM. Enemy air forces were very active throughout the day.

(5) Reconnaissance for crossings over the ZINN RIVER was resumed early 16 April in the face of fierce enemy resistance from the south bank.

(a) The bridge at TRAUTSKIRCHEN was determined to be the easiest to repair in the zone of the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, and accordingly the main effort of that organization was directed to securing a bridgehead at that point. By 1430B, the strong enemy resistance south of TRAUTSKIRCHEN had been neutralized, and a treadway bridge was constructed without delay. Troop C followed by Troop A, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, crossed and moved southwest to DANBERS-BACH capturing the town at 1530B. Both units then turned southeast and, after overcoming several defended roadblocks, seized NEUDORF at 2030B. An enemy column marching toward that town was surprised and dispersed with heavy casualties by artillery and small arms fire.

(b) The 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, found the bridge at NEUHOF to have been prepared for demolition, blocked by fallen trees and strongly defended, but still intact. After an all day battle, enemy resistance was sufficiently weakened to permit combat patrols to seize the bridge and clear the demolition charges and road block. At 1800B, a crossing in force was made and the Squadron fought its way into the town. By 2030B, it had been

cleared of enemy and was outposted for the night.

(c) Hq and Hq Tr, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, moved from LENKERSHEIM to MERZBACH and thence to TRAUTSKIRCHEN.

(6) Enemy strength in the Group zone appeared to be disintegrating, and on 17 April resistance was offered only at certain crossings over the BIBERT RIVER, while others within a few kilometers were undefended. The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, crossed at LEONROD and received heavy fire from the woods to the west. The Squadron side slipped east and was again hotly opposed at KLEIN-HASLACH as it attempted to cross the HASEL BRANCH. A second evasive movement resulted in an unopposed crossing 1 km to the northeast at KEHLMUNZ. At 1730B, the Squadron attacked HEILBRONN and, after entering the northern outskirts, was forced to withdraw by intense enemy automatic weapons, panzerfaust and mortar fire. The 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, proceeded southeast in its zone overcoming such scattered resistance as was encountered. Both Squadrons halted for the night along the Division Phase Line No. 1 (ANSBACH - HEILBRONN - NURNBERG road). The Group CP moved from TRAUTSKIRCHEN to BETZENDORF.

