

(7) During the operations 14 - 17 April, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, advanced 43 kms against enemy resistance ranging from scattered to fierce, destroyed all enemy formations in a zone 25 kms wide, inflicted severe personnel and equipment losses on the enemy and captured 332 prisoners of war. Our losses for the period were 4 killed 12 wounded. None was missing.

f. (1) At 0430B, 18 April 1945, Opns Instrs No. 40, Headquarters 12th Armored Division, issued. The direction of the division attack was turned southwest along the axis ANSBACH - FEUCHTWANGEN - CRAILSHEIM. CC-B was directed to move to the southwest and seize and secure FEUCHTWANGEN. CC-A was ordered to follow CC-B on its axis and occupy ANSBACH. The 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, received the mission of moving on all available routes to protect the south flank of CC-B and assist it in its attack on FEUCHTWANGEN.

(2) Squadron axes were prescribed by CO, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, as follows:

92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz — GLEIZENDORF - LANGENLOE - LICHTENAU - ZANDT - NIEDEROBERACH - SACHSBACH - BURK - DURRWANGEN.


116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz — PETERSAURACH - ZIEGENDORF - SCHLAUERSBACH - WOLFRAMS-ESCHENBACH - MERKENDORF - WEIDENBACH - BEHHOFEN - UNTER-KONIGSHOFEN - BEYERBERG - AMMELBRUCH - KEMMATHENDORF.

(3) The 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, operating on the northwesterly axis, moved out early 18 April and at 0800B met determined enemy resistance at WICKLESGREUTH on the HEILBRONN-ANSBACH road. A fire fight ensued and the

enemy retired toward the FRANKISCHE RIVER and there assumed new defensive positions. After a hard fight the Squadron crossed at IMMELDORF, and pushed south against a series of delaying actions through WATTENBACH and BAMMERSDORF. At 2000B, Troop C, 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, reached LEIDENDORF and intercepted an enemy column moving northwest toward ANSBACH. Assault gun and artillery fire were placed on it with excellent results. By dark, Troop C, 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, had occupied LEIDENDORF and Troop D, 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, had entered WOLFRAMS-ESCHENBACH. Elements of Troop B, 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, after having been repulsed at WINSBACH, assembled for the night at PETERSAURACH.

(4) The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, operating on the southeasterly axis, moved at first light 18 April, and passed through PETERSAURACH and ZIEGENDORF against light enemy resistance. The bridge over the FRANKISCHE RIVER at SCHLAUERSBACH was seized intact by Troop A, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, at 1400B. Troop A, followed by Troop C of the same Squadron, moved rapidly south until it reached the vicinity of WOLFRAMS-ESCHENBACH where determined enemy resistance was encountered. Troop A, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, engaged the enemy at that town while Troop C, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, bypassed to the west and moved on MERKENDORF. After a prolonged and bitter battle, the troop forced its way into the town, driving elements of both the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division and the SS Totenkopf Division to the east and southeast where they assumed new defensive positions approximately one kilometer from the town. Troop A, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, cleared the enemy from WOLFRAMS-ESCHENBACH and moved to the

MAP XII



MAP
Showing Area of Opns
101st Cav Gp (Mec)
92d Cav Rcn Sq attached
20 Apr - 22 Apr 1945

southwest, by-passing MERKENDORF and entering TRIESDORF without opposition. Hq and Hq Tr, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, and 92nd Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, moved their CPs to PETERSAURACH. The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, established its CP at WOLFRAMS-ESCHENBACH.

(5) The boundary between XV and XXI Corps was changed 18 April 1945 and NURNBERG became the responsibility of the XV Corps. OI 41, Headquarters 12th Armored Division, 181400B was received by Headquarters 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, during the night 18 - 19 April. The direction of the division attack as prescribed in OI 40 (see par f (1) above) was changed to turn south at FEUCHT-WANGEN along the axis WORT - LAUCHHEIM. The 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, was directed to establish a protective screen, blocking along the line HEILBRONN - BERGOBERBACH - ZANDT - HEILSBRONN and to maintain contact between 12th Armored Division and 42nd Infantry Division (XV Corps).

(6) At 0420B, 19 April, approximately 150 SS troopers counterattacked Troop C, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, attached First Platoon Co F and Third Platoon Troop E, both of 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, Capt Louis Bossert, commanding, at MERKENDORF, striking simultaneously from the south, the east, and the northeast. Two outposts on the east side of the town were surrounded and overwhelmed after a savage fight in which the entire security detachment became casualties. Before succumbing, they killed 11 and wounded an undetermined number of the enemy. The outpost at the south end of town killed one officer, one master sergeant, and six enemy privates before its tanks were destroyed by panzerfaust fire. The attack from the northeast was repelled. The enemy succeeded in entering the town in force before dawn and were aided

by civilians who pointed out buildings in which our troops had been billeted. In anticipation of such a possibility, troop billets had been changed after dark and the effectiveness of this phase of the enemy plan was in a large measure frustrated. The troop CP was attacked by panzerfaust fire and four SS troopers were killed as they attempted to enter through the windows. Under the conditions; organization for battle was impossible, but the entire personnel of the troop and attached units seized their weapons and entered the fight without hesitation. For over two hours a series of bloody hand to hand engagements were fought throughout the town. Attackers were repelled by small arms, knives and furniture thrown from windows. At daylight, enemy reinforcements were observed approaching from the southeast. By this time, the situation within the town was under control and a defense against the new threat was hastily organized. Machine gun and small arms fire were brought to bear upon the enemy and the attack was broken up before it reached the town. Eighty of the SS troopers who participated in the initial attack were killed, sixteen were captured and an undetermined number were wounded. Troop C and attached units suffered losses of two killed, ten wounded, seven missing.

(7) (a) 1 Plat Tr B, 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was dispatched early 19 April to gain and maintain contact with CC-A at HEILBRONN and, upon the latter's departure, to relieve it of responsibility for maintaining contact with the 42nd Infantry Division. The balance of the Squadron was directed to block the line ZANDT (excl.) - HEILBRONN.

(b) The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was relieved of attachment to the 4th Infantry Division and reverted to the control of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, at

191400B April. It was ordered to block along the line HEILSBRONN - BURGOBERBACH (excl.).

(c) The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was assigned the center portion of the line from BURGOBERBACH to ZANDT, both incl.

(d) By dark, all elements had assumed their blocking positions or were en route thereto. The 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, moved its CP from PETERSAURACH to ANSBACH.

(8) During operations for the period 18 and 19 April, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, protected the south flank of the 12th Armored Division during its operations at HEILBRONN, ANSBACH, and FEUCHTWANGEN, inflicted severe casualties on the enemy and captured 777 prisoners of war. Losses sustained were 2 killed, 12 wounded and 5 missing.

(Note: 2 of those reported missing in par f (6) above later escaped and rejoined their unit.)

g. (1) At 0930B, 20 April 1945, VOGG 12th Armored Division, were received relieving the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, of its blocking mission, and directing it to reconnoiter south in the division zone - left (east) boundary: main highway FEUCHTWANGEN - DINKELSBUHL - MARKTOFFINGEN - NORDLINGEN; right (west) boundary: MARKTHUSTENAU - WILDENSTEIN - WESTHAUSEN. Troop B, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was relieved of attachment to CC-R and reverted to Squadron control.

(2) The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was assigned the right (west) portion of the zone and the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, the left (east). The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was held in reserve and directed to assemble at HERRIEDEN. Hq and Hq Tr, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, moved from ANSBACH to HERRIEDEN.

(3) (a) The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, being in position at the northern end of the new zone of the division at the time the Group mission was received, moved out promptly, covering the zone assigned to the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, as well as its own until such time as the latter Squadron could move west from its positions south of HEILBRONN. The principal effort of the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was directed along the FEUCHTWANGEN - DINKELSBUHL road. Determined enemy resistance was encountered along the line ZWERNBERG - SCHOPFLOCH. Troop C, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was unable to overcome the resistance at SCHOPFLOCH and, after a strong effort, withdrew at 1800B to a position in observation about one kilometer north. At 1900B, CC-A moved into SCHOPFLOCH, destroyed the enemy forces therein and continued to the northern outskirts of DINKELSBUHL where further progress for that day was ended by a destroyed bridge.

(b) The 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, moved west from its positions south of HEILBRONN against enemy rear guard actions and road blocks. At dark 20 April the Squadron assembled at TURNHOFEN.

(c) The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, moved west through ANSBACH and assembled at HERRIEDEN.

(d) Hq and Hq Tr, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, moved forward to ZUMBERG.

(4) (a) Late 20 April, the 12th Armored Division plan of operations was modified. CC-A was directed to move in two columns, one task force moving southeast on the DINKELSBUHL - MARKTOFFINGEN - NORDLINGEN road and the other by secondary roads in the direction DINKELSBUHL - BOPFINGEN.

(b) At 210045B, C.O. 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, directed the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, to move south between the two columns of CC-A and to destroy all enemy encountered in the zone. The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was directed to continue reconnaissance to the south in the zone - right boundary (west): MARKT-HUSTENAU - WILDENSTEIN - WESTHAUSEN; left boundary (east): axis of the western task force of CC-A, excl. The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was continued in Group reserve and directed to move to DINKELSBUHL.

(5) (a) CC-A and 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, moved rapidly south during the early hours of the day against light enemy resistance. However, in the late afternoon stronger enemy positions were developed and the Squadron was forced to halt for the night at KIRCHHEIM, about three kilometers short of the objective line.

(b) The advance of the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was resisted with great determination from the moment it passed south of the east-west road NEUSTADTLEIN - DINKELSBUHL. Sharp fights were had at ROTTEIN, BERNHARDSWEILER, KETSCHENWEILER and ES-BACH, and the Squadron was unable to penetrate the enemy defenses at WILDENSTEIN and LAUTERBACH. Troop C, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, side slipped to the west and then turned southeast to UNTER-DREIFSTATTEN in rear of the enemy line. Task Force Brock was formed and given the mission of eliminating enemy resistance in the pocket formed by the maneuver of Troop C, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz. This force included Troop B, 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, and Troop B, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, the latter having been drawn from Group reserve for the purpose. After a prolonged battle, the combined pressure of Task Force Brock on the north and Troop C, 101st Cav Rcn

Sq, Mecz, from the south, broke the enemy centers of resistance and by night 21 April, the Squadron had advanced to the line MATZENBACH - UNTER-DEUFSTATTEN. Contact was maintained with the enemy occupying the wood areas to the south throughout the night.

(c) The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, (less Tr B), remained at DINKELSBUHL in Group reserve throughout the day and, at 211700B, was ordered to move into the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, zone. The Squadron, closed at UNTER-DEUFSTATTEN before dark.

(d) The 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, moved its CP to STEINWEILER.


(6) (a) At dark 21 April 1945, elements of 12th Armored Division were disposed as follows:

CC-A assembled vicinity KIRKINGEN
CC-B assembled vicinity DINKELSBUHL

CC-R assembled vicinity DINKELSBUHL.



MAP XIII



MAP
Showing Area of Opns
101st Cav Gp (Mech)
92d Cav Rcn Sq-attached
22 Apr - 23 Apr 1946

Elements of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, were disposed as noted in preceding paragraphs.

(b) Opns Instns No. 42, Headquarters 12th Armored Division issued at 212300B, April 1945, and confirmed verbal orders given one hour earlier. The division was ordered to attack to the south in the zone - right (west) boundary: MARKT-HUSTENAU - WILDENSTEIN - WEST-HAUSEN - GROSSKUCHEN - GUNDELFINGEN; left (east) boundary: main highway FEUCHTWANGEN - DINKELSBUHL - MARKTOFFINGEN - NORDLINGEN - HARDBURG - DONAUWORTH (excl.), to seize and secure crossings over the DANUBE RIVER. CC-A was directed to continue its advance to the south and secure crossings over the DANUBE RIVER in the DILLINGEN area. CC-B was ordered to move at daylight, assist 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, to clear centers of resistance east of BOPFINGEN, continue advance to the south and seize crossings over the DANUBE RIVER vicinity of HOCKSTADT. CC-R was given the mission of blocking the main east-west highway (LAUCHHEIM - NORDLINGEN) through the division zone and was to be prepared to move south or southeast on division order. The 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, was directed to continue to the south on the division left with one Squadron, and seize crossings over the DANUBE RIVER in the TAPFHEIM - ERLINGSHOFEN area. The other Squadrons were to follow the CCs and the advance Squadron, and to mop up by-passed centers of resistance in the division zone.

(7) (a) C. O. 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, assigned the mission of seizing crossings over the DANUBE RIVER to the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz. After resupplying during the hours of darkness, the Squadron moved forward early 22 April. The enemy reacted strongly. All roads to

the south were defended stubbornly but by 222000B, the Squadron had reached the EGER RIVER. Fierce enemy resistance from the south bank prevented a crossing and a halt for the night was made at TROCHTELFINGEN. The town of PFLAUMBACH two kilometers east was strongly held by the enemy.

(b) The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was relieved of its mission to clear enemy resistance from the woods south of UNTER-DEUFSTETTEN and directed to move south through LAUCHHEIM, mop up enemy resistance along the LAUCHHEIM - BOPFINGEN road and then continue south to the DANUBE RIVER and seize crossings in the vicinity of LAUINGEN. The Squadron, assisted by CC-R, overcame initial enemy resistance in the LAUCHHEIM - BOPFINGEN area by dark 22 April. A bold night march was executed and by 222330B, the Squadron had occupied the town of LAUINGEN. However, the enemy had destroyed all bridges over the DANUBE RIVER in that vicinity before they could be seized.

(c) The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, cleared the enemy from the wooded areas south of UNTER-DEUFSTETTEN and late 22 April was directed to assemble in Group reserve at KIRCHHEIM.

(d) Hq and Hq Tr, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, moved from STEINWEILER in the early afternoon and closed at TROCHTELFINGEN by dark 22 April.

(8) (a) The 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, moved out before dawn 23 April. Enemy resistance to its immediate front had withdrawn during the night, and the Squadron moved rapidly southeast via secondary roads to OPPERTSHOFEN, its progress being impeded only by undefended road blocks and demolitions. All efforts to reach the DANUBE RIVER plain were sternly resisted by enemy rear guards covering the withdrawal of their main body across the river at ERLINGSHO-

FEN. Artillery fire was directed at the retreating German columns with good effect and after a prolonged fight, the Squadron forced its way into TAPFHEIM and ERLINGSHOFEN. The enemy destroyed all bridges over the DANUBE RIVER as their last elements to escape crossed. Combat patrols from the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, met fierce resistance from the high ground west of REIDLINGEN and all attempts to cross the EGER RIVER vicinity of DONAUWORTH were repulsed. The Squadron established its CP at ERLINGSHOFEN and was subjected to harrassing fire from enemy artillery on the south bank of the DANUBE



throughout the night.

(b) The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, continued to garrison LAUINGEN throughout 23 April. At 1000B, a strong force from that Squadron was despatched with the mission of seizing the bridge at OF-FINGEN, about ten kilometers to the southwest. The force moved rapidly on its objective by secondary roads but the bridge was destroyed by alert enemy bridge guards as it approached.

(c) The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, mopped up the remaining enemy resistance in the vicinity of KIRCHHEIM and then assembled at TAPFHEIM at 232000B.

(d) Hq and Hq Tr, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, moved early 23 April and maintained close contact with 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, throughout the day. The Group CP was opened at TAPFHEIM at 231700B.

(9) CC-A had seized the bridge over the DANUBE RIVER at DILLENGEN intact and secured a limited bridgehead in that vicinity.

(10) During operations for the period 20—23 April 1945, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, in conjunction with the CCs of the 12th Armored Division, advanced a total of 65 kilometers against varying degrees of enemy resistance, reconnoitering a zone up to 30 kilometers in width and destroying all organized resistance encountered therein. The north bank of the DANUBE RIVER was reached on a broad front. Many casualties were inflicted upon the enemy and a total of 867 prisoners of war were taken. The Group suffered casualties of 8 wounded. None was killed or missing.

h. (1) (a) Opns Instns No. 43 issued from Headquarters 12th Armored Division at 0100B, 24 April 1945. The plan contemplated the reinforcement of the DILLINGEN bridgehead over the DANUBE RIVER and the seizure of any bridges remaining intact in the Corps

zone. (ULM, excl. - DONAUWORTH, excl.)

(b) CC-A, attached 15th RCT, 3rd Infantry Division, received the mission of securing the captured DILLENGEN bridge and reinforcing the bridgehead. CC-B was directed to be prepared to move on division order southwest along the south bank of the river and to secure any bridges remaining intact in the Corps zone. CC-Rs mission was to execute a similar maneuver on division order along the north bank of the DANUBE. CC-B and CC-R were each to be preceded by one Squadron of Cavalry.

(c) The 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was relieved of its mission on the Corps left flank and ordered to move without delay to an assembly area south of the DANUBE RIVER vicinity of GLOTT, and to be prepared to precede CC-B on the south bank of the river, or to move south to seize crossings over the MINDEL and GUNZ RIVERS. The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was alerted for movement to the southwest along the north bank of the DANUBE in advance of CC-R. The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was directed to relieve the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, at ERLINGSHOFEN and to protect the corps left flank from positions north of the DANUBE.


(2) (a) During the morning 24 April, prior to the start of the new mission, elements of the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, which were securing the right (west) flank of the 12th Armored Division from positions vicinity of GUNDELFINGEN received and defeated a counterattack from enemy troops attempting to move south across the DANUBE in a contiguous zone. At 1600B, the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, followed by CC-R, moved southwest on the north bank of the river. Determined enemy resistance was met west and southwest of GUNDELFINGEN. The flat and marshy nature of the terrain

made maneuver of armored vehicles extremely difficult and little progress was made on the 24th.

(b) The 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was relieved at ERLINGSHOFEN on 24 April and crossed to the south bank of the DANUBE RIVER via the DILLINGEN bridge at about 1600B. The Squadron moved rapidly southwest through the division bridgehead. Troop C attacked and neutralized enemy resistance at BURGAU and seized and held the causeway and bridges over the MINDEL RIVER at that point. Troop A continued



MAP XIV



south and seized the autobahnn crossings over the river about one kilometer distant. Both units held their respective crossings throughout the night against enemy attempts to infiltrate demolition parties through their lines.

(c) The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, relieved the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, at ERLINGSHOFEN and assumed responsibility for the division left flank. Contact with enemy forces was maintained west and southwest of RIEDLINGEN. Observed artillery fire was placed on enemy columns between RIEDLINGEN and DONAUWORTH with excellent results, but continued probing of his lines indicated no disposition to abandon his strong defensive positions vicinity of RIEDLINGEN.

(d) Hq and Hq Troop, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, moved from TAPFHEIM to DILLENGEN.

(3) (a) The 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, continued to hold the bridges over the MINDEL RIVER throughout 25 April and pushed combat patrols south to SCHEPPACH. Much enemy activity was observed in the wooded areas south of the autobahnn and west of MINDEL RIVER. Two air strikes were requested and flown with good effect. Troop C, 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, sustained a counterattack at BURGAU during the night and the fighting continued through daylight.

(b) Elements of the 63rd Infantry Division had moved down on the right of the 12th Armored Division and established bridgeheads over the DANUBE RIVER at LEIPHEIM and GUNZBURG. The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was relieved of its mission with CC-R north of the DANUBE on 25 April and crossed to the south bank at DILLINGEN, assembling vicinity of WEISENGEN at 1700B.

(c) The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, continued to protect the division left

throughout the 25th of April and maintained pressure on the enemy vicinity of RIEDLINGEN. Combat patrols swept the wooded areas north and northwest of TAPFHEIM capturing more than 100 prisoners of war. In the late afternoon, elements of the 42nd Infantry Division moved south along the 12th Armored Division left boundary and entered DONAUWORTH after a terrific fight.

(d) During the night 25—26 April, the enemy launched a strong counterattack against the 63rd Division bridgehead at LEIPHEIM and GUNZBURG.

(4) At 260545B, the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was relieved of responsibility for the 12th Armored Division left flank and moved promptly to MONSTETTEN south of the DANUBE RIVER. Hq and Hq Troop, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, preceded the Squadron and closed in the same general area at 260600B.

(5) (a) Early 26 April the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, was directed to continue reconnaissance to the southeast in the 12th Armored Division zone, the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, on the right and the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, on the left. The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was directed to relieve elements of the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, of responsibility for the bridges at BURGAU and on the autobahnn one kilometer to the south. The relief was completed by 0730B and the 92nd and 101st Cav Rcn Sqs, Mecz, moved forward in their respective zones.

(b) As was later developed, the enemy held strong defensive positions north of the autobahnn from SCHEPPACH to HIRBLINGEN and depended upon his position at BURGAU, and artillery on the west bank, to block the MINDEL RIVER corridor. The counterattack against the 63rd Infantry Division bridgehead west of the MINDEL RIVER continued throughout the day, and the

enemy force at BURGAU was contained by friendly troops.

(c) Elements of the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, moved south on the east bank of the MINDEL RIVER to THANNHAUSEN without serious opposition, and then turned east in rear of the enemy MLR to ZIEMETSHAUSEN. Other elements of the Squadron which had attempted to move south by routes east of MINDEL RIVER corridor were unable to penetrate the enemy defensive positions north of the autobahn. As soon as the enemy strength in that area had been fully developed, such elements were disengaged and diverted to the open route on the east bank of the MINDEL. The Squadron reassembled in the ZIEMETSHAUSEN area. At 1400B, a courier from the 17th SS Corps was intercepted east of ZIEMETSHAUSEN by a combat patrol. Several top secret German documents were taken, including a marked map showing enemy operations for 26 April. The operations map disclosed that 3 enemy divisions had been committed to the counterattack against the LEIPHEIM - GUNZBURG bridgehead and that a 4th enemy division was defending along the line described in par 5 (b) above. It also showed the boundary between enemy Corps to be the MINDEL RIVER. Perhaps confusion regarding responsibility for the defense of that corridor contributed to the relative ease with which a penetration was made. The enemy map was promptly sent to 12th Armored Headquarters. In exploitation of the success of the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, C. O. 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, directed the Squadron to continue its advance to the south-east and seize crossings over the WERTACH RIVER at HILTENFINGEN and SIEBNACH. The Squadron moved on its objective via the axis ZIEMETSHAUSEN — ALCHEN — MITTEL-HILTENFINGEN, overcoming strong rear

area defenses at ALCHEN and capturing 60 prisoners of war and 6 nebelwerfers. The race for the WERTACH RIVER was resumed and at 2000B the bridge near HILTENFINGEN was seized intact. The Squadron pushed on into the town against disorganized resistance and by 262120B, it had secured two additional bridges over smaller streams and captured the town.

(d) The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, moved forward in its zone - central axis GLOTT - ZUSMARSHAUSEN - and at 260800B, forward elements encountered determined enemy resistance along the ZUSAM RIVER at BAIERSHOFEN and ELLERBACH. After a long fight, the enemy positions were reduced and the Squadron side slipped to the east bank



of the ZUSAM RIVER and turned south. Good progress was maintained until fierce opposition from entrenched enemy supported by 88mm guns and 20 and 40mm AA guns stopped further progress north of the autobahn vicinity of ZUSMARSHAUSEN. After a prolonged and bitter battle, the enemy was driven from his position and forward elements of the Squadron moved southeast against continued opposition reaching KUTZENHAUSEN at dark. At 2100B, the Squadron was directed to continue to the south and seize the bridges over the WERTACH RIVER at GROSS-AITINGEN. After a short halt, the advance was resumed until finally stopped by enemy small arms, automatic weapon, mortar and artillery fire from positions on the wooded high ground southeast of the line FISCHACH - DIEDORF.

(e) Troops A and B of the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, relieved the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, from the positions on the bridges over the MINDEL RIVER at BURGAU and on the autobahn one kilometer to the south, at 260730B. Troop C, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, moved east along the autobahn meeting resistance in the wooded areas about three kilometers east of SCHEPPACH. At 1500B, Troop A, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was relieved of its mission vicinity of BURGAU and moved east to ROSSHAUPTEN and thence south, joining forces with Troop C at the autobahn. The two troops cleared the heavily wooded area of enemy, uncovering hundreds of enemy airplanes and an underground airplane parts factory. At 2100B, the Squadron was relieved of its security mission at the bridges and directed to assemble at HILTENFINGEN to assist the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, in securing its bridgehead over the WERTACH RIVER.

(f) Hq and Hq Troop, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, was mobile throughout the

day, moving from DILLENGEN to MONSTETTEN to SCHEPPACH and thence to ZIEMITSHAUSEN.


(g) At 2300B, CG, 12th Armored Division directed CC-A to proceed to the HILTENFINGEN bridgehead and relieve elements of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz. The Group was ordered to push forward with all available troops and seize crossings over the LECH RIVER in the division zone. Shortly before midnight, Hq and Hq Troop, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, followed by elements of the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, and CC-A moved to HILTENFINGEN, arriving before daylight 27 April.

(6) (a) At 270430B, C. O. 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, directed the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, to move rapidly to the southeast and seize the bridges over the LECH RIVER in the vicinity of LANDSBERG. The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was ordered to proceed without delay and seize the bridge at SCHWABSTADL.

(b) Both Squadrons moved forward against scattered enemy resistance reaching their respective objectives at about 0830B to find that the enemy had destroyed the bridges upon their approach. Reconnaissance was immediately extended to KAUFERING and DORNSTETTEN with equally disappointing results. During the course of the days operations, the 92nd and 116th Cav Rcn Sqs, Mecz, completed a detailed reconnaissance of the west bank of the LECH RIVER in the 12th Armored Division zone, made recommendations for the repair of blown bridges and suitable sights for the construction of new bridges, captured 80 grounded airplanes, 12 AA guns, 362 prisoners of war and innumerable enemy vehicles.

(c) Shortly after daylight, 27 April, the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, overcame enemy resistance along the FISCHACH -

MAP XV



DIEDORF line and moved forward, seizing the bridge over the WERTACH RIVER at GROSS AITINGEN at 1315B.

(d) The 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, and the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, established command posts at SCHWAB-MUNCHEN. The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, closed at GROSS AITINGEN.

(7) During operations for the period 24-27 April 1945, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, furnished security for both flanks of the 12th Armored Division, crossed the DANUBE RIVER, probed the enemy's MLR south of that river until a weak spot was found and then poured through the gap, advancing about 40 kms deep into the rear of the enemy defenses and seizing two bridges over the next major water obstacle. The collapse of enemy defenses in the 12th Armored Division zone between the DANUBE and the WERTACH RIVERS may be attributed in a large measure to the success of the 101st Cavalry Group's maneuver. In the course of these operations several hundred grounded enemy planes were captured, innumerable vehicles were captured or destroyed, immense quantities of materiel and 2801 prisoners of war were taken. The Group exclusive of the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, suffered casualties of 4 killed and 9 wounded.

i. (1) (a) Opns Instns No. 44, 12th Armored Division issued at 280300B, April 1945. Large concentrations of enemy troops had been reported in MUNICH, SACHSENRIEDER and ROTHWALD. The division received the mission to cross the LECH RIVER by all available bridges on the morning 28 April and to attack to the southeast to seize and hold the towns of WEILHEIM and BAD TOLZ, and deny the enemy the use of the passes into the Bavarian Alps south of WEILHEIM, PENZBURG and BAD TOLZ. CC-A, preceded by one Squadron of Cavalry,

was given the responsibility for blocking the passes south of WEILHEIM and PENZBURG. CC-B was directed to block the pass south of BAD TOLZ. CC-R was ordered to assemble vicinity of WEILHEIM and await orders.

(b) The 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, less the Squadron preceding CC-A, was directed to advance to the east and southeast and protect the division east flank by blocking the southwestern exits from MUNICH along the line ARGET - GRUNWALD - FURSTENFELD-BRUCK.

(c) The partially destroyed railroad bridge vicinity of LANDSBERG was selected as the most suitable for quick repair. 12th Armored Division engineers worked throughout the night and by 280600B, the bridge was ready for traffic.

(2) (a) The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was assigned the mission of preceding CC-A on its attack to southeast. Forward elements of the Squadron moved across the bridge at 0600B in the face of scattered small arms fire from the east bank and unobserved artillery fire, and preceded south through LANDSBERG, thence southeast via the main road to WEILHEIM. Only scattered resistance was encountered until the town of ROTT was reached. At this point, the enemy defended stubbornly and further progress was halted. Troop B, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, maintained contact with the enemy throughout the night. During the hours of darkness, Troops A and C, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, attempted to by-pass the enemy center of resistance at ROTT and moved by secondary roads to positions in the vicinity of DIESSEN.

(b) The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was assigned the northwestern half of the blocking line, and followed the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, across the bridge. The Squadron moved due east with the initial objective of seizing the causeway over

the northern tip of AMMER SEE vicinity of ECHING. Progress was delayed by enemy demolitions, and the Squadron was forced to detour south through UNTERFINNING and thence north by the main road paralleling the west shore of AMMER SEE. The enemy launched an attack from the woods southeast of GREIFENBERG against the head of the Squadron column, employing four (4) tiger tanks and a substantial number of infantry. After a short sharp fight, the enemy retreated to the northeast with the forward elements of the Squadron in close pursuit. However, as the last elements of the enemy crossed the causeway, prepared demolition charges were set off and the roadway was rendered unusable. As further progress was impossible, the Squadron halted for the night and outposted the AMMER RIVER line.

(c) The 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was assigned the southwestern half of the blocking line and followed Hq and Hq Troop, 101st Cav Gp, Mecz, across the railroad bridge. Due to initial delays in the crossing of the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, caused by enemy resistance and to continuous delays throughout the day for bridges repairs, the crossing of the 92nd Squadron was not completed until late 28 April. The Squadron moved east to ERESING and there halted for the night in support of the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz.

(d) Hq and Hq Troop, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, crossed between the 101st and 92nd Cav Rcn Sqs, Mecz, and established its command post at LANDSBERG.

(3) (a) Troop A, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, moved forward prior to daylight 29 April and at dawn had reached the main highway between DIESSEN and MITTERFISCHEN. The troop raced east, surprised the enemy defending the bridges over the AMMER RIVER and captured them intact. Troop C, 116th Cav

Rcn Sq, Mecz, moved into DIESSEN and captured the town and a military hospital containing about 400 convalescent enemy soldiers. Troop B, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, renewed the attack vicinity of ROTT at first light and by 1000B had overcome the resistance and moved forward to the western outskirts of WEILHEIM, capturing the bridge over the AMMER RIVER intact. The troop pushed ahead against sporadic sniper fire, and by 1100B had secured the town. CC-A had crossed the LECH RIVER during the night 28-29 April and reached WEILHEIM at about 1130B. The mission of the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, and CC-A had been changed from that given above, to one of moving through the mountain passes and capturing INNSBRUCK. The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, less Troop B, moved south on WEILHEIM to rejoin CC-A but met determined resistance vicinity of PAHL. In order to avoid delay in the movement of CC-A, Troop B, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was withdrawn from Squadron control and attached to CC-A. (for account of Troop B, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, in that operation, see Inclosure No. 3). After overcoming the enemy opposition at PAHL, the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, less Troop B, assembled in WEILHEIM to await further orders.

(b) Upon receipt of information regarding the capture of the bridges vicinity of MITTERFISCHEN by elements of the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, C.O. 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, directed the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, to relieve the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, at the north end of AMMER SEE, and ordered the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, to move south to the bridges at the southern end and relieve the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, of its responsibility for the vital bridges. The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, moved down the west shore of AMMER SEE, mopping up scattered resistance en route, and entered DIESSEN at

about 1300B. At 1400B, two individuals who identified themselves as representatives of a revolutionary party in MUNICH appeared at the Group CP at DISSEN, reported that Nazi authority within the city had been overthrown by the people, and requested that American troops enter without delay. They stated that no enemy resistance would be encountered en route. The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was directed to move on MUNICH via the axis MITTERFISCHEN - HERRSCHING - OBER-PFAFFENHOFEN, thence Highway 12 to MUNICH. At 1930B, the Squadron encountered a strongly defended road block at OBER-SEEFELD. All attempts to by-pass were blocked by fiercely resisting enemy. It was determined that a strong enemy force was moving to the wooded heights dominating the HERRSCHING - OBER-SEEFELD road with the purpose of attacking the Squadron column on the flank. The information regarding the revolution in MUNICH having been proven to be false in part at least, the Squadron withdraw to HERRSCHING for the night.

(c) The 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was relieved of its blocking mission at the north end of AMMER SEE and moved south to assembly positions vicinity of WILZHOFEN.

(d) Hq and Hq Troop, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, cleared LANDSBERG early 29 April, moved to DISSEN and operated a mobile CP there during the day. In the late afternoon, the CP moved to WEILHEIM.


(4) (a) At 300600B, CG 12th Armored Division directed C.O. 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, to send one Squadron via BAD TOLZ - CR D870943 - CR D930945 - CR 985903, thence south to the INN RIVER valley to intercept enemy elements moving to the southwest. The mis-

sion was assigned to the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, which moved rapidly southeast against scattered enemy resistance to the outskirts of PENNZBERG. The enemy resisted with the greatest stubbornness and an all day battle took place. The Squadron finally entered the town at 2000B and pushed combat patrols east to seize crossings over the LOISACH RIVER. All approaches to the river were heavily defended and the patrols withdrew to PENNZBERG at dark.

(b) Early 30 April, C.O. 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, cancelled the 101st Cav Rcn Sq's mission to MUNICH and directed it to block along the line MITTERFISCHEN - SEESHAUPT. By midday, the Squadron had completed its deployment along the prescribed line. In the late afternoon it was ordered to assemble at SEESHAUPT in anticipation of a new mission.

(c) The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, less Troop B, moved at first light 30 April to reconnoiter for crossings over the LOISACH RIVER in a zone to the south of that covered by the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz. The Squadron advanced against sporadic enemy resistance and reached the river in the late afternoon. Bridges at RAIN and SINDELSDORF had been destroyed.





(d) The 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, moved its command post from WEILHEIM to HOCHSCHLOSS.

(5) For a summary of this operation, see unit history for May 1945.

6. Miscellaneous:

a. The 342nd Armored Field Artillery was attached to or in direct support of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, from 14 April through the close of the period covered by this report. The excellent fire support rendered by that Battalion on all occasions contributed materially to the successful operations of the Group.

b. Total casualties of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, are:

	1 - 30 April 45	Total to 30 April 45
Killed in action	28	44
Wounded in action	93	160
Missing in action	5	11
c. Prisoners of War	17,042	18,241

Casualties include only those suffered by Hq and Hq Troop, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, and 101st and 116th Cav Rcn Sqs, Mecz.



CHARLES B. MCCLELLAND
Colonel, Cavalry
Commanding.



APRIL INCLOSURE No. 1

(Operations 101st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized
14 - 19 April 1945 — period attached to 4th Infantry Division.)

The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was relieved of attachment to the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, and attached to the 4th Infantry Division, effective 140600B April. The Squadron moved to positions vicinity of BUCHEIM, and covered the assembly of the 4th Infantry Division on 14 - 15 April.

Troop A, which had been on Detached Service with Sixth Army Group Headquarters, returned to Squadron control on 15 April.

Pursuant to orders of the CG, 4th Division, the Squadron was attached to the 8th Infantry Regiment on 16 April. The Regiment was given the mission of

attacking to the southeast along the axis SCHWEBHEIM - ANSBACH, the Squadron to reconnoiter in its zone. Troop A, reinforced with 1 platoon of light tanks (Co F), was ordered to reconnoiter for crossings over the railroad running east and west along the high ground south of BERGEL and to proceed to an initial objective at POPPENBACH. Troop B, with 1 platoon of assault guns (Troop E) attached, was ordered to reconnoiter a route along the general axis HABELSEE-BINZWANGEN. The balance of Company F was attached to the 8th Infantry, being further attached on the basis of 1 platoon to each assault battalion (1st and 3rd).

During 16 April the Squadron moved

forward against scattered resistance. All railroad crossings in Troop A zone had been demolished but a number of by-passes were reconnoitered and reported to the Regiment. Troop B patrols continued southeast on extremely poor roads in their zone, which were not suitable for Division loads. They were recalled and ordered to follow Troop A on the discovered by-passes.

On 17 April, Troop A was shifted to the right of the zone, and given the mission of clearing towns in the general area BURGHAUSEN - DORNHAUSEN - OBERSULZBACH. Troop B reconnoitered along the main axis toward ANSBACH. Troop C was ordered to establish a blocking line along the south edge of the wooded area from ANFELDEN to HORNDU. This screen was established to cut off the retreat of enemy forces driven south by the attack of the infantry through the woods. At the conclusion of the coordinated attack and screening mission, Troop C moved to the right flank of the 8th Infantry Regiment to establish a protective line.

On 18 April, the Squadron continued its reconnaissance to the front of the 8th Infantry against stiffening resistance. By nightfall they had developed a strong enemy line of resistance along the high ground north of BERBERSBACH in the vicinity of BUCH a WALD - JOCHSBERG. Contact was maintained with the enemy during the night and on the morning 19 April, the positions were assaulted by the 8th Infantry. Troop A and C by-passed the enemy resistance and continued to the southeast. They were stopped along the line of the railroad, from ANSBACH to CRAILSHEIM in their zone, by defensive positions of the enemy supported by mortar and artillery fire. Pressure against the enemy was continued until the attack was taken up by the infantry.

At 1400B, the Squadron reverted to control of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, and was ordered to move south and east of FEUCHTWANGEN to establish a counter-reconnaissance screen along the line HEILSBRONN - BURGOBERBACH (excl.).

APRIL INCLOSURE No. 2

(Operations Troop B, 116th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron,
Mechanized, for period 14 - 20 April 1945.)

This Troop was detached from the Squadron on 14th April 1945. The Troop had been moving on a zone reconnaissance mission with the Squadron up until this time, and had revealed the MLR of enemy in its zone. Orders were received on 14th April, relieving Troop from Squadron, and attaching it to Combat Command "R", 12th Armored Division. This CC, on the date of attachment, was moving toward ANSBACH, GERMANY,

following generally the main highway from UFFENHEIM, GERMANY, to ANSBACH, GERMANY, as an axis, and its advanced elements were operating southward on said highway about 6 miles east and slightly south of HABELSEE, GERMANY.

The Troop Executive Officer was sent as liaison officer to CCR Headquarters, where he remained throughout the period of attachment. Instructions were to

remain in observation of the enemy, which we had located, pending further orders. Observation posts were set up by day (and listening posts by night) through which enemy, along the line STEINACH, GERMANY - ENDSEE, GERMANY, were kept in observation. This situation held until the Troop received order on 16 April to move vic ILLESHEIM, GERMANY, and secure the flanks and rear of both advancing columns of the CC. The CC had then departed from the highway and was advancing southward on ANSBACH from the north, parallel to the main north south highway, a few kilometers to the east of same. The bulk of the Troop followed the axis of the 17 AI Bn, while the 1st Rcn Platoon was assigned the axis of the 23rd Tank Bn, to the east. The same afternoon the mission was clarified and modified to be specifically "the flanks and rear of the CC Artillery". With this as its mission, the Troop continued until 20th April when the 12 AD assembled in FEUCHTWANGEN, GERMANY.

However, in addition to the security mission, the 1st Rcn Platoon was called on to perform a special reconnaissance

mission for the CO, CCR. On short notice, the 1st Rcn Platoon was dispatched by itself, on 18th April, with the mission of road reconnaissance in order to find a short cut around ANSBACH, GERMANY, to the west. This mission was performed, and a 10 kilometer strip of road was reconnoitered and accurately reported, from vic LEHRBERG to vic COLMBERG. The platoon was unable to advance further after encountering an estimated company of enemy Infantry, which units of the CC later disposed of. This operation was thoroughly and efficiently carried out, eliciting the verbal commendation of the CO, CCR. The platoon was under the command of S/Sgt. John A. Hopkins.

As the 12 AD was assembling in FEUCHTWANGEN, GERMANY, the Troop was relieved of its original security mission, and ordered to assemble just north of FEUCHTWANGEN, GERMANY, and to deny entrance into the said town from the north. The same evening, 20 April 1945, the Troop received orders relieving it from attachment to the 12 AD, CCR, releasing it back to Squadron control.

APRIL INCLOSURE No. 3

(Operations Troop B, 116th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron,
Mechanized, for period 29 April 1945—2 May 1945.)

On 29th April 1945 this troop was attached to Combat Command "A", 12th Armored Division, at WEILHEIM, GERMANY. It was assigned the mission of route reconnaissance along the main highway from WEILHEIM, GERMANY, through OBERAU, GERMANY, to INNSBRUCK, AUSTRIA. The mission was assigned at 1230 in the afternoon, and INNSBRUCK, AUSTRIA, was designated

as the objective for the day, a distance of some 80 road miles. The Troop had one Platoon Co F, one Platoon Medium Tanks, one Platoon Troop E attached. Movement started about 1315. The troop had gone about 5 miles when the leading platoon was taken by fire from both flanks and front — one platoon of Infantry with organic weapons and Panzerfaust. After a thirty minute engagement, the enemy

force on the left withdrew from action, and the force to the front and right was driven into the open where it suffered heavy losses while fleeing. The column proceeded.

A few miles further on the axis, another enemy force of similar size and composition was encountered defending an up-right-log-type road block. This enemy force was driven by fire from their positions and withdrew from action after a short fire fight. An engineer bulldozer-tank required 40 minutes to reduce the roadblock. Progress was resumed.

As the troop approached MURNAU, GERMANY, it came around a bend in the road, revealing to the immediate front an enemy Concentration Camp, still under fullguard, with sentries in their elevated box-houses, others walking guard. The leading vehicles opened fire immediately killing and wounding many. Two automobiles loaded with SS personnel trying to escape had their contents scattered by direct hits with 76 mm guns from the medium tank platoon. As the troop advanced past this camp, to the outskirts of MURNAU, a small detachment with Sgt. Feist in charge was sent to check what was apparently a hospital of considerable size, to the right of the road. This Sgt. unexpectedly, upon his arrival at this "hospital", received the surrender of a general officer and his staff and several hundred men. However, owing to the rapid rate of movement, this information did not reach the Troop Hq until it was some miles past the spot, and engaged in another fight.

As the head of the troop had passed the southwestern edge of MURNAU about 1500 yards, it encountered a force of some 20 enemy infantrymen, who held the column up with Panzerfaust fire for about 10 minutes. Three or four were killed and the remainder withdrew from action. 400 yards further another upright-log-type

road block was encountered, undefended, requiring about 35 minutes to reduce. The column continued.

About 1730, the point platoon, then the 2nd Platoon, came under enemy rifle and panzerfaust fire from both flanks, the rifle fire being at medium-long range. This fire was first encountered about 2 miles below MURNAU. The four panzerfaust men were killed outright. After an attempt to neutralize the enemy riflemen by fire, who were extremely difficult to see, it became apparent that complete neutralization would require time-consuming dismounted operations. Therefore it was decided to "run the gauntlet". Casualties were sustained in this process, this troop sustaining one killed and one wounded, and the Combat Command sustaining some wounded. The rifle unit was in larger strength than estimated at first, as they kept the entire column under constant fire along a 3 mile stretch of road all the way into the town of ESCHEN-LOHE, GERMANY. Just on the far end of this town another road block of the type mentioned before was encountered, covered by sniper fire of small volume. Again the reduction of the block took about 40 minutes, after which the column proceeded to OBERAU, GERMANY, uneventfully. Continuation of the mission of the CC was cancelled the next morning, and the command awaited orders until the following evening, when the troop was ordered to precede the CC rapidly to the north getting on the trail of CC "R", 12 AD. The troop moved at daylight the following morning, first to WEILHEIM, GERMANY, and then on to STARNBERG, GERMANY, without encountering any resistance. The troop was ordered to assemble in STARNBERG, GERMANY, and await further orders. Orders were received relieving troop from CC A, 12 AD, releasing it to Squadron control on 2 May 1945.

May



May found these Cavalry units partly in the foothills of the Bavarian Alps and partly in the plains adjacent to the Chiem See where one of the many castles of "Mad" King Ludwig still stands in all its beauty on an island just offshore. The units were reassembled and made ready to pursue the remaining elements of the SS known to be "holing-up" in the mountains to the south. "Hitler's Redoubt" certainly looked formidable but it turned out to be just another myth produced by Nazi propaganda.

"Epic Of The Autobahn"

The next episode rightfully should be called the "Epic of the Autobahn". A branch of that wonderfully constructed six (6) lane highway runs from Munich to the south and southeast just above the Austrian border. It seemed that every unit of the American Army, including the 2nd French Armored Division were all boiling down this highway at one and the same time and all headed for BERCHTESGADEN! The 101st Airborne Division, of Ardennes Bulge fame, to which the Group was now attached, had commandeered every type of German civilian and army vehicle imaginable for transportation. It was a sight never to be forgotten. A few days later an equally impressive spectacle took place along this same highway when an unending grey-brown horde of dejected humanity, once the proud legions of Adolf Hitler, flowed slowly to the rear.

"Shooting War" Ends

The Group's mission took its different units down the valleys to the west of BERCHTESGADEN and into the Austrian Tyrol where, war or no war, sheer scenic beauty remained supreme. Fighting was only sporadic as the columns penetrated the mountain passes. In one last encounter, however, approximately 100 SS Troopers were killed outright. Our losses were only two slightly wounded. Yes, the battle "know how" of these cavalymen had come a long way since that first night in February on the SAAR RIVER FRONT. On May 5th the shooting war on the Group's front was over but they were still to have one of the strangest experiences encountered throughout the entire conflict.



“Disarm The SS!”

The war was over, yes, but because of disrupted communications within the remnants of the German Army there were a number of enemy units which were not aware of that fact. The Group was given the job of moving ahead for the purpose of informing said enemy units. In the process of doing just that the emissaries of Obergruppenfuhrer and General Waffen SS, Gottlob Berger (Second only to Himmler in the SS) came forward seeking terms of surrender. This was accomplished. Among the terms given was permission for all SS officers and guards to retain their sidearms for the purpose of maintaining order prior to and during the period of disarmament generally. The Cavalry was given the job of going in and taking over. Thus, for a period of several days this handful of men, relatively speaking, found themselves living in the same towns with thousands of men who only a day or two before had been their mortal enemies. Guards in OD and other armed guards in field grey with SS insignia on their collar tabs paced their posts on opposite sides of the street. There was perfect discipline on both sides.

Nazis And Japs Are Taken

During this period “flying” detachments of the Cavalry “took” Field Marshal Kesselring with his entire staff who had been making their headquarters in Hitler’s private railroad train. The train was modern in every detail and its appointments equalled the best to be found in America. Another Cavalry detachment “bagged” the Japanese Ambassador to Germany and his entire entourage at BADGASTEIN, a beautiful Austrian mountain resort. A number of high Nazi officials also were taken at that place. Just to make things more interesting a woman who claimed to be a Hungarian Baroness appeared on the scene with a strange and unbelievable tale about a train hidden in a nearby tunnel which she said contained jewels, paintings and other art objects valued at a total of twenty-five million dollars ... and even more strange was the fact that her story turned out to be true.

No record of the 101st Cavalry in World War II would be complete without a page of Alfred Hopkins’ original “characters” which became the hallmark of 101st humor back in training camp days. Remember “What’s Cookin’”? (The Germans who made the reproduction on the page opposite were impressed by the fact that American humor is “without pain“.) Ed.

HEADQUARTERS
101st Cavalry Group, Mecz
APO 758, U. S. Army

23 June 1945.

SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy, Reports After.

TO: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

THRU: Command Channels.

1. In accordance with the provisions of AR 345 - 105, dated 18 November 1929, and Change 4, dated 10 August 1944; letter Hq ETOUSA, subj: "Handling of Historical Documents in the European Theater of Operations", file AG 312.1 Op History, dated 14 July 1944, and Section IV, Circular No. 34, Headquarters Seventh Army, dated 28 November 1944, the following report is submitted.

2.* The inclosed reports and journals with supporting documents constitute the historical records of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., for the period 1 May 1945—10 May 1945.

3. During the period covered by this report, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., was commanded by Colonel Charles B. McClelland, with Lt Col Leo W. Mortenson as Executive Officer.

4. Composition:

a. There was no permanent change in the composition of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., from that noted in the unit history for the period 1 January 1945—2 February 1945. Certain attachments and detachments were made during the period covered by this report. These are noted in the order in which they occurred.

b. At the close of operations 30 April 1945, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., was attached to the 12th Armored Division. The 101st, 116th, and 92nd Cav Rcn Sqs, Mecz., were attached to the Group. The 342nd Armored Field Artillery (105 SP) and 1 Plat Co A, 119th Engr (C) Bn were in direct support.

* Not included herein.

5. Narrative History:

a. At 2359, 30 April 1945, elements of the Group were disposed as follows and were engaged on the missions indicated:

(1) 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was assembled at PENZBERG with the mission to proceed via BAD TOLZ - CR D870943 - CR D930945 - CR 985903, and thence south to the INN RIVER valley to intercept enemy elements moving to the southwest. The bridge over the LOISACH RIVER at RAIN had been destroyed.

(2) 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was assembled at SEEHAUPT awaiting the assignment of a new mission.

(3) 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, had determined that the bridge over the LOISACH RIVER vicinity of SINDELSDORF had been destroyed, and was assembled in that vicinity prepared to continue its reconnaissance for crossings the next day.

(4) Hq and Hq Troop, 101st Cav Group, Mecz, had established its CP at HOCHSCHLOSS.

b. The results of the bridge reconnaissance had been reported to the 12th Armored Division and repairs to the bridge at SINDELSDORF were begun at once by CC-B. The 36th Infantry Division, which had moved into the Group zone, repaired the bridge at RAIN during the night 30 April - 1 May.

c. (1) At 010007, orders were received through Headquarters 12th Armored Division detaching the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, from the Group and attaching it to the 4th Infantry Division. The Squadron was ordered to assemble at STARNBERG at the north end of WURM SEE. (For account of 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, for the period 1 - 4 May, see Inclosure No. 1).

(2) The 92nd and 116th Cav Rcn Sqs, Mecz, continued reconnaissance for crossings over the LOISACH RIVER during the morning 1 May, and determined that

all bridges in the Group zone had been destroyed. At 1300B, permission for the Group to use the 36th Infantry Division bridge at RAIN was obtained, and the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, followed by Hq and Hq Troop, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, and the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, crossed in that order.

(3) The 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, continued to the east on its mission and, in conjunction with elements of the 36th Infantry Division, attacked the enemy defenses west of BAD TOLZ. Slow progress was made and at 2300B, the enemy destroyed the bridge over the ISAR RIVER vicinity of BAD TOLZ.

(4) At 1600B, the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, turned north with the mission to seize all bridges over the LOISACH - ISAR CANAL which remained intact in the zone KONIGSDORF - WOLFRATSHAUSEN (excl). The reconnaissance continued throughout the night 1 - 2 May and isolated pockets of enemy resistance were met and overcome. All bridges were found to have been destroyed.

(5) The 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, CP was established at BAD HEILBRONN.

d. (1) Time estimates for the construction of a new bridge at BAD TOLZ indicated a long delay and at 0140B, 2 May, CO 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, ordered all elements of the Group to move north via routes east of WURM SEE and cross the ISAR RIVER through the 4th Infantry Division bridgehead at WOLFRATSHAUSEN. CC-A, 12th Armored Division, had crossed at that point during the night 1 - 2 May with orders to proceed to ROSENHEIM and thence south through the INN RIVER valley.

(2) At 0645B, 2 May, VOGC 12th Armored Division directed the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, to follow the route of CC-A, entering the autobahn at HOLZKIRCHEN and proceeding to the bridge over the INN RIVER. The mission of the 92nd

Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was cancelled and the Group was further ordered to screen the left flank and rear of CC-A along the line ROSENHEIM - OSTERMUNCHEN and to patrol the autobahnn from HOLZKIRCHEN to the INN RIVER bridge. CO 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, assigned the screening mission to the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, and directed the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, to patrol the autobahnn within the limits noted above.

(3) The Group crossed at WOLFRATS-HAUSEN at 1200B, and moved rapidly east. The autobahnn bridge over the SCHLIERBACH RIVER vicinity of MUHTHAL had been demolished. Troop A, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, moved north through GRUB thence east and south to the autobahnn and at 1725B, secured the INN RIVER bridge. The balance of the Group, less elements of the 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, which had been dropped off to patrol the autobahnn, moved to BAD AIBLING. Troop C, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, extended the screen north to OSTERMUNCHEN. The Group CP was established at BAD AIBLING.

e. The security missions described in paragraph d above, continued through 3 May 1945.

f. (1) During operations 28 April - 3 May 1945, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, advanced approximately 90 kilometers in the face of variable degrees of enemy resistance, protected the left flank of the 12th Armored Division during its operations south of AMMER and WURM SEES, cleared the road for CC-A through WEILHEIM, protected the flank and rear of CC-A as it turned south into the INN RIVER valley, made extensive reconnaissances of intervening water obstacles, inflicted many casualties upon the enemy and captured 5136 prisoners of war. Our losses were 1 killed and 7 wounded.

(2) During this period many officers and men of the 101st Cavalry Group,

Mecz, witnessed at first hand the results of some of the most horrible crimes perpetrated by the Nazi regime, including the body strewn concentration camp northwest of LANDSBERG which was still smoking when our troops arrived, the trainload of murdered political prisoners near PENZBERG and the pitiable condition of the few prisoners who escaped.

g. (1) At 040500B, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, was relieved of attachment to the 12th Armored Division and reverted to XXI Corps control. The 92nd Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was relieved of attachment to the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz.

(2) The Group was directed to proceed east via the autobahnn until contact was gained with elements of the French 2nd Armored Division, and then to turn south into the Bavarian Alps. Troop C, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, assembled at first light 4 May and moved rapidly east, gaining contact with the French at 0630B, 1 kilometer west of the TRAUN RIVER vicinity of OBER SIEGSDORF, who reported that the bridge had been destroyed and that the enemy were defending from the east bank. Troop A, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, attached 1 Plat Troop E and 1 Plat Company F, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, turned south into the defile along the west bank of the TRAUN RIVER, overcoming a defended road block at NEUSTADL and pursuing the enemy to SEEHAUS where forward movement was halted by a destroyed bridge and a defended road block. Other elements of the 116th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, followed and assembled in RUHPOLDING. The Group CP was established in that town.

h. (1) Early 5 May 1945, CO 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, directed the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, to continue its attack south to the Austrian border, initial objective REIT im WINKL. Troop A, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, attached 1 Plat Troop



E, and 1 Plat Company F, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, and 1 Battery, 342nd AFA Bn, was ordered to continue on its axis and attack REIT im WINKL from the east. Troop B, 116th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, attached 1 Plat Troop E, and 1 Plat Company F, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, and 1 Battery, 342nd AFA Bn., was directed to move via UNTER AICH - EGERNDACH - UNTER WOSSEN and attack REIT im WINKEL from the north. Troop C, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was held in reserve.

(2) Both units moved out at first light 5 May, Troop A, reinforced, fought its way south against strongly defended road blocks and abatis, reaching SEEGATIERL at 1200B where it was again halted by fanatical enemy resistance. Enemy dead were identified as personnel of SS Junker Schule Tolz. After a hot fight, the town was cleared at 1430B. Troop A turned east and moved forward against an almost unbroken series of obstacles all of which were defended by small arms and automatic weapons fire from the heights on each side of the defile. Progress was continuous but very slow.

(3) Troop B, reinforced, encountered a number of undefended road blocks and

at 1300B, entered the town of MAR-QUARTSTEIN. The southern exit from the town was held in strength by the enemy and a sharp battle was had before forward movement could be resumed. The troop proceeded about 1 kilometer south and was again halted by an impassable road crater which was strongly defended by small arms, automatic weapon and mortar fire. Reconnaissance for a by-pass was begun at once.

(4) At 1100B, 5 May, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, was attached to the 101st Airborne Division and directed to continue on its mission. The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, had been previously relieved of attachment to the 4th Infantry Division and attached to the 101st Airborne Division. By order of the latter division, the Squadron reverted to Group control at 051100B.

(5) At the time the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, reverted to Group control, it was engaged in reconnaissance of the CROSSE ACHE RIVER valley. Contact had been established with Troop B, 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz. In order to coordinate the effort of all units in the valley, the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, was assigned the axis GRASSAU - RAITEN - SCHLECHING - KOSSEN.

(6) At 051615B, May 1945, the following message was received from the 101st Airborne Division: "German Army this sector has surrendered. All units remain in place." Forward elements halted and the shooting war in the European Theater of operations was at an end for the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz.

i. During operations on 4 - 5 May 1945, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, advanced to the east a distance of approximately 50 kilometers, turned south into the Bavarian alps and penetrated two mountain passes against stubborn enemy resistance to a maximum depth of 28 kilometers, killed more than 100 enemy soldiers, most

of whom were SS troopers, and captured 3122 prisoners of war. It is a source of gratification to the Group that, in this final operation of the European war, our casualties were limited to 2 slightly wounded, neither of whom was evacuated.

j. The total number of prisoners of war taken by the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, from first contact with the enemy on 11 February 1945 to the surrender of the German army in the Group zone on 5 May 1945, was p7346, exclusive of those taken by the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, during the periods it was detached from the group.

k. (1) Pursant to VOCG 101st Airborne Division, road blocks of platoon strength were established along the autobahnn between OBER SIEGSDORF and ROHRDORF at 060600B, for the purpose of collecting prisoners of war and concentrating them in the enclosure at FRAUNDORF. Three such blocks were established by the 101st and two by the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz. Thousands of enemy soldiers were processed.

(2) In the late evening 6 May 1945, Opns Instns No. 12. Headquarters 101st Airborne Division was received. Instructions to the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, were as follows:

"a. Upon receipt of these instructions, send reconnaissance parties under officer control and with interpreters operating under a flag of truce to contact all German troops in zone.

(1) Reconnaissance parties will

a) Inform German commanders of surrender of Army Group "G".

(b) Acquaint German commanders with terms of surrender.

(c) Allow sufficient time for German commanders to verify surrender.

(d) Designate to German commanders assembly areas for troops and locations of dumps for surrendered arms and

materiel.

b. Upon completion of above instructions, move sufficient troops to garrison all large towns and villages in sector, establish military government and maintain law and order.

c. Occupy sector as prescribed in overlay issued 5 May 1945."

(3) (a) The sector assigned to the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, was bounded as follows:

North: the autobahnn

West: The INN RIVER

South: WINDSHAUSEN - KOSSEN - SEEGATIERL

East: OBER-SIEGSDORF - SEEGA-TIERL

(b) The Group sector was sub-divided into three sub-sectors each under control of the unit noted:

Western sub-sector, INN RIVER to the mountain pass BERNAU - SACHRANG, incl — 342nd AFA Bn (-), attached Troop A, 101st and Troop A, 116th Cav Rcn Sqs, Mecz.

Central sub-sector, east boundary of western sub-sector, incl., to the mountain pass MARQUARTSTEIN - KOSSEN, incl - 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, (-) attached 1 btry, 342nd AFA Bn.

Eastern sub-sector, eastern boundary of central sub-sector, excl., to the eastern boundary of the Group sector - 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, (-), attached 1 btry, 342nd AFA Bn.

(4) All elements moved south in their assigned sectors at 070700B, May. Repairs were begun by the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, on the destroyed bridge at SEEGATIERL. At 0900B, elements of the 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, were halted one mile south of MARQUARTSTEIN on the main highway by an officer of the 13 SS Corps bearing a flag of truce who stated that the SS was not under command of German Army Group "G" and therefore

not bound by the terms of surrender. He said that Obergruppenfuhrer and General Waffen SS Gottlob Berger, second only to Heinrich Himmler in SS rank, wished to negotiate with our higher headquarters for the surrender of his troops. Further movement of our units was halted while General Berger was escorted to Headquarters 101st Airborne Division. The principal component of his force was the 13th SS Army Corps, commanded by SS General Max Simon and comprised of the 2nd Mountain Division, Division von DONAT, and the SS Nebelungen Division. It is of particular satisfaction to the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, to have been instrumental in the surrender of these troops in as much as they had been its principal opponents ever since the Group crossed the RHINE RIVER on March 29th.

(5) In accordance with the terms arranged with General Berger, the 101st and 116th Cav Rcn Sqs, Mecz, and Hq and Hq Troop, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, moved forward in their assigned sectors at 081100B, and by late afternoon, had occupied all enemy installations and disarmed all enemy troops therein. The 342nd AFA Bn was relieved of its occupation mission and directed to assume responsibility for the road blocks along the autobahn. The Cavalry troops previously attached to that battalion reverted to the control of their respective Squadrons. Command posts were established as follows:

Hq and Hq Troop, 101st Cavalry Group,
Mecz: KOSSEN,
101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz: KAPPEL,
116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz: REIT im
WINKL.

(6) Information had been received by higher headquarters indicating the presence of Marshall's GORING and KESSELRING in the vicinity of ZELLERSEE. In compliance with orders of CG



101st Airborne Division, one platoon of the 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, under the command of Major Edward French, was dispatched in the early afternoon 8 May to apprehend them. When the platoon reached its objective, it was learned that Marshal GORING had already been taken into custody. Upon the strength of information gained locally, the platoon then proceeded to SAALFELDEN and captured Marshall KESSELRING and his entire entourage of 60 officers and approximately 250 enlisted men and women, together with ADOLF HITLER'S personal railroad train. (A copy of Major French's informal report to C.O. 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, is appended as Section I of Inclosure No. 2).

1. Pursuant to the instructions contained in Opns Instns No. 14, Headquarters 101st Airborne Division, elements of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, displaced and regrouped early 9 May 1945. The

101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, assumed responsibility for the enemy personnel and installations in the KOSSEN - WINKL area. The 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, moved south, established its CP at ST ULRICH, and took over all elements and materiel of SS Division von Donatz in the general area LEOGANG to FIEBERBRUNN and the pass from HOCHFILZEN north to WAIDRING. No change was made in the location of the Group and 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, command posts.

m. (1) Upon completion of the relief of the balance of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, by elements of the 502nd Parachute Infantry, Hq and Hq Troop, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, moved southeast early 10 May in the SALLACH RIVER valley to SAALFELDEN and there established its CP. The 101st Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, followed, and assumed responsibility for the SALLACH RIVER valley from ST MARTIN to MITTERHOFEN and the SONNBERG valley from ROSENTHALL to MUSSBACH. The Squadron established its command post in SAALFELDEN.

(2) Road blocks were established by both Squadrons throughout the Group area. Movement of German prisoners numbered in the tens of thousands was controlled, stock piles of enemy vehicles, weapons, materiel and ammunition were consolidated and inventoried.

(3) (a) At about 0930B, 10 May 1945, Major Edward French and his detachment were relieved of responsibility for Marshall Kesselring and party by G-3, 101st Airborne Division, who instructed him as follows:

"You and your platoon will move to BADGASTEIN immediately. We have information that the Japanese Embassy, German Secretary of Economics, Secretary of Agriculture and other German officials are located there."

(b) The platoon arrived at BAD-



GASTEIN at 1230B and arrangements were made through the Swiss Counsel for a meeting with Herr Von Dornberg, Chief of Protocol of the German Foreign Office and Mr. Uchida, First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy. Both officials were ordered to provide complete rosters of personnel and to instruct all members of their respective parties to remain within their hotels. Road blocks were established at all exits from the town. A second meeting was had with the local German military commander and similar instructions were issued. German military personnel, including hospital patients, numbered in excess of 5000 including 12 general officers.

(c) At about 1530B, Major French was informed by the Hungarian Baroness Adele Bornemisza that there was a railroad train in the vicinity containing valuables belonging to the Hungarian government valued at approximately 25,000,000 dollars. She stated that it was

under the guard of a small detachment of Hungarian soldiers who had repelled several attempts by SS troopers to loot the train. After considerable passive resistance from the railroad officials, the train was removed from the tunnel in which it was hidden. There was 25 freight cars in all and four were inspected. One contained oriental and Persian rugs, the second contained oil paintings, and tapestries, the third solid silver and the fourth was loaded solidly with cases of gold, principally jewelry. The Hungarian custodian explained that his chief had departed several days ago with the entire stock of diamonds.

(d) Enemy personnel taken into custody at BADGASTEIN by personnel of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, included:

Japanese Ambassador to Germany:

Baron Oshima,

First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy: Uchida,

135 members of the Japanese diplomatic staff and their families,

Secretary of State for the Reichsministry of Agriculture: Willekens,

Reichsminister and Chief of Reichschancellery: Harnaike,

Chief of Reichschancellery: Lammers,

Reichsminister of Economics and President of the Reichsbank: Funk,

Postmaster General: Ohnesorge,

Chief of Protocol of German Foreign Office: Von Dornberg.

(e) All of the above named were turned over to a CIC Detachment of Headquarters XXI Corps late 11 May 1945, at BADGASTEIN, who moved them under guard provided by personnel of the

116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, to CIC headquarters.

(f) Elements of the 506th Parachute Infantry completed the relief of Major French and his detachment at 0630B, 12 May 1945.

(g) Copy of Major French's informal report to C.O. 116th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz, is appended as Section II of May, Inclosure No. 2.


6. Miscellaneous:

a. The 342nd Armored Field Artillery and the platoon of Co A, 119th Engr (C) Bn, were relieved of their missions of direct support on 6 May 1945. Both had been of immense assistance to the Group throughout the period of association.

b. The 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, was relieved of attachment to the 101st Airborne Division on 11 May 1945, and directed to assemble in the vicinity of LORCH, GERMANY.

c. Total casualties suffered by Hq and Hq Troop, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, and the 101st and 116th Cav Rcn Sq's, Mecz, were:

	1 - 5	Total to 5
	May 1945	May 1945
Killed in Action	0	44
Wounded in Action	2	162
Missing in Action	0	11
		217



CHARLES B. MCCLELLAND
Colonel, Cavalry
Commanding.



MAY INCLOSURE No. 1

(Operation 101st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized for the period the Squadron was attached to the 4th Infantry Division.)

On 1 May 1945, the Squadron was relieved of attachment to 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, and attached to 4th Infantry Division at 0645, and ordered into assembly area at STARNBERG. Troop A was dispatched on route reconnaissance across the LOISACH and ISAR RIVER. A basis of information obtained, Squadron was ordered to cross the rivers at WOLF-RATSHAUSEN and establish a counter-reconnaissance screen along the line STRASSLACH - BERGHAM. The screen was established at 2000B, after some delay caused by the almost impassible condition of secondary roads.

On 2 May 1945, the screen was held without incident until 1615B. Squadron relieved by Division order and instructed to prepare for movement on 3 May, and to send patrols without delay to reconnoiter truck routes to GROSSHOLZHAUSEN. Road blocks and demolitions on main roads, and impassible condition of side roads blocked entirely two of the patrols. The third patrol, consisting of a platoon from Troop B, finally achieved objective and reported back to the Squadron at 031130B.

On 3 May 1945, the Squadron moved at 1030B to assembly area vicinity, BEITHAM, and there received orders to relieve elements of CT 22 along the line Y-980148 - Z-0514, and to screen assembly of CT 506, of the 101st Airborne Division. Screen set up along road to front of line at 1510B. At 1350B first contact with French forces established at bridge at Z-052142, by Troop A.

On 4 May 1945, Squadron held screen,



relieved of attachment to 4th Infantry Division and attached 101st Airborne Division effective 1200B. Ordered to proceed without delay to BAD REICHENHALL and reconnoiter CP for 101st Airborne Division. Halted by order CG 3rd Infantry Division vicinity NEIDER-REID, and ordered by 101st Airborne Division to remain in place for night, and move in morning to clear zone between Z50 and Z60 grid lines from the autobahn south to Z10 grid line.

On 5 May 1945, moved on mission at 0730B, Troop B axis GRASSAU - RARIEN; Troop C axis BAYERN - EGERNBACH - WINKL. Troop B was held up temporarily by mortar fire at Y-545165, stopped at Y-4911 by blown bridge. Troop C met no opposition until halted by defended road block south of MARQUARTSTEIN. CO Troop C was contacted by representative of General Berger and negotiations were undertaken resulting in the surrender of the latter's command.



MAY INCLOSURE No. 2


(Informal report of Major Edward French to CO 116th Cavalry
Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized.)

SECTION I

"When we received our mission, I was unable to locate anyone with knowledge of the best route. Therefore we took off in the direction of BERCHTESGADEN and then headed due south. Progress was slow because of the mountainous terrain, and upon reaching a bridge approximately 10 miles south of BERCHTESGADEN, we found that it was blown and that there were no by-passes. Fortunately the enemy did a poor job and after about an hour's work reconstructing the bridge the platoon continued on, only to be stopped by another blown bridge further on. The enemy did a good job of this one but upon inspection the stream was found to be wide but not deep and to have a good bottom. The men went to work with shovels preparing the banks, and after removing the fan belts from the vehicles the entire platoon succeeded in getting across.

The platoon reached ZELL AM SEE at approximately 1500 to find everything quiet. But there were an awful lot of German soldiers walking around and the majority of them were SS. Captain Hellman (interpreter from IPW Team 164) and I contacted the Burgermeister and upon questioning him learned that the town contained three large hospitals, one of them SS, and many soldiers who had come to the vicinity recently. We learned also that at the main hotel a German Military Staff was billeted.

The platoon formed their vehicles in an open area near the town square and Captain Hellman and I went to the hotel. At the hotel we were met by a Captain from the 36th Infantry Division who said he was acting as Liaison officer with the German staff who were in contact with Field Marshal Kesselring. The Captain was questioned as to the whereabouts of Kesselring and Goering but his reply was in the negative. We questioned him further about the location of other high ranking officials, but the only information we obtained was that he was liaison and that his headquarters was negotiating for the surrender of Kesselring and Goering through the German staff at the hotel. We were making no progress so it was decided to check the three hospitals and secure a list of the hospital staffs and patients. This only brought out the fact that there were almost 3000 soldiers hospitalized in the town plus the normal garrison. We still had no information on Kesselring or Goering. Further questioning of the Burgermeister brought no results. Sgt. Schnalzer, platoon leader from Troop "A", while speaking to an escaped Belgian prisoner of war, learned of a large castle located at BRUCK, a village about three miles SE of ZELL AM SEE. Part of the patrol proceeded to the castle and upon arrival found the castle was being protected by a reconnaissance platoon of a TD Company of the Third



Army. An officer was questioned but the only information he would give was the fact that the castle contained SS personnel and that the Commanding General of the 36th Infantry Division had just left and had given the platoon leader instructions to keep all allied personnel out of the area. The whole affair seemed suspicious!

It was getting late so we decided to go back to the hotel at ZELL AM SEE to try our luck again on getting information. After further questioning we learned from a German officer that a train which contained Field Marshal Kesselring and his staff plus accompanying troops, was at SAALFELDEN RR Station. The patrol immediately went to SAALFELDEN, located the train, and Captain Hellman and I reported to the Adjutant and explained that we were to see that the Field Marshal and his staff were held in protective custody. The Adjutant brought us to the car of Field Marshal Kesselring and explained our mission to the Field Marshal and General Winters, Chief of Staff, and they agreed that no attempt to leave the train would be made by the Field Marshal or any of his staff. A guard was organized in the vicinity of the train and the balance of the platoon used the hotel across the street from the RR station as quarters. All went well during the night.

At about 0900 the next morning, three members of the press arrived and requested an interview with the Field Marshal, which was denied them. They waited around. At approximately 0930 a small patrol was dispatched to the castle at BRUCK to see what was happening there. Upon arrival the patrol noticed there were about four large sedans (German markings) and about three German staff cars. An American officer was contacted and it was learned that Goering and family with Goering's staff surrend-

ered to the Commanding General, 36th Infantry Division in the castle at 2200 the previous night. We understood then that the 36th Division knew where Goering was all the time and had made negotiations for the surrender.

The patrol returned to ZELL AM SEE and checked in at the hotel and then I met a Captain from the 508th Infantry Parachute Battalion who was a member of an advance party to locate billets for the battalion in the vicinity. Information and hospital lists were turned over to the Captain as they were of no value to the Squadron, and might assist them when they set up military government in the area. We went to SAALFELDEN at 1130. While making a check of the train, Major Peiper of the Field Marshal's staff again requested information as to when an American officer of "rank" would arrive to discuss the meeting place for negotiations.

At 1330 a Colonel from XXI Corps arrived and spoke to General Winters, German Chief of Staff. After the conference with him the Colonel informed me he would probably return later that afternoon and instructed me to continue on my mission of guarding the train. At about 1430 a Major from the 101st Airborne Infantry Division arrived and said he had instructions from Commanding General 101st Airborne Division to make arrangements for Kesselring and certain members of his staff to be taken to 101st Airborne Headquarters at BERCHTESGADEN. However, the Major didn't make much progress. General Winters, speaking for the Field Marshal, insisted that Marshal Kesselring was entitled to conference with an American official other than a local commander.

At the end of the day no one knew what was to be done with the Field Marshal. The three members of the press

were still there and had not had an interview! The next morning at 0300 a liaison officer from the 101st Airborne Division woke me up and gave me the following instructions: "General Taylor will arrive at SAALFELDEN at 0900 for a conference with Field Marshal Kesselring. Please make the necessary arrangements to see that everything is prepared for the General."



SECTION II

General Taylor, accompanied by his G 3 and interpreter, arrived at 0920 and were shown to the Field Marshal's car. Shortly thereafter the G 3 gave me the following instructions: "You and your platoon will move to BADGASTEIN immediately. We have information that the Japanese Embassy, German Secretary of Economics, Secretary of Agriculture and other German officials are located there."

At 1000 the platoon was organized and on the road for BADGASTEIN. The trip was uneventful and the surrounding country was beautiful. We arrived at BADGASTEIN at approximately 1230 and immediately established two blocks on the entrances to the town from the south. Captain Hellman, Sgt. Stutzman and I immediately went to the Swiss Embassy to secure information as to who was in the town and in the vicinity. The Ambassador and his wife and Mr. Buchmuller, a member of the staff who spoke English, were very happy to see us and very hospitable. Mr. Buchmuller arranged for the Japanese Ambassador to come to the hotel and also for the Chief of the German Foreign Office, Von Dornberg, to

come to see us. Von Dornberg arrived at 1400. I instructed him to give us a list of all men who had anything to do with the German Government, civilian or military, and that, furthermore, none of these people including their staffs would leave their hotels.

Mr. Uchida, First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy, arrived at 1430 and explained he was very sorry that the Ambassador was not present, but he was not feeling well. Mr. Uchida was informed he would secure a list showing all members of the Embassy, down to the last child, and that no one was to leave their hotels. Arrangements were made with the Burgermeister for a meeting at 1530 to include the local Commandant of all the hospitals in the vicinity, of which there were eight. On the way to the Burgermeister's office we were stopped by an elderly lady and a young man. The lady was Baroness Adele Bornemisza of Hungary. The man was a Hungarian Count. The baroness called us aside and told us, secretly, she needed our assistance - that there was a train in the vicinity which contained valuables belonging to the Hungarian government valued at approximately 25 million dollars and that Nazi soldiers had made several attempts to loot the train. Things were getting (awfully) complicated!

We took the Baronesses' name and hotel and told her we would see her later! When we met the Burgermeister we gave him the usual instructions on curfew, weapons, etc (weapons had already been collected). He would issue instructions that no one would leave the town. A list would be furnished giving names of all prominent people in the town. (The commandant of hospitals had a list of high-ranking officers in hospitals in vicinity which included twelve generals.)

After more conversation we learned that Mr. Franz Wagenleitner, the Bürgermeister, and others in the town were instigating a movement in Austria to free Austria of German rule and set up a free Austrian government. Things were really getting complicated!

When we secured the lists from the Japanese Embassy we found that the Embassy consisted of the Japanese Ambassador Mr. Oshima, family and members of his staff and their families - a grand total of 137. Lists of the German officials revealed the following prominent people:

Secretary of State in the Reichs-
ministry of Agriculture: Willekens,
Reichsminister and Chief of the
Reichschancellery: Harnaike,
Chief of the Reichschancellery:
Dr. Lammers,
Reichsminister of Economics and Pre-
sident of Reichsbank: Dr. Funk,
Postmaster General: Dr. Ohnesorge,
Chief of the German Foreign Office:
Von Dornberg.

Complete papers, listing officials and staffs were immediately dispatched to Squadron.

Road blocks were set up on all exits from the town to prevent unauthorized people from leaving. Until additional men could arrive this was the only way to handle the situation.

The night was quiet with no trouble of any kind. The following morning at approximately 0800 I was walking through the streets to go the Swiss Embassy to try and get further information on the story Baroness Bornemisza gave me about the 25 million dollar train, when suddenly I was approached by a man of large frame who took my arm and quickly whisked me into a nearby

hotel and asked me to be seated. The man, who spoke a little English, introduced himself as Nemeth Sandor, the Austrian wrestler. ((He had wrestled in the US — I remember seeing a match.)) He said he was at present acting as Secretary to Dr. Tobias Kornel, official of the Hungarian government. He said they knew the location of this train and were very much interested in seeing that it was taken over by the American forces, since Nazi officials were trying to confiscate the valuables. Things were getting more and more complicated! I couldn't figure out the relationship between the Baroness and Kornel. It seemed to me that both of them had their own fish to fry!

I went to the Swiss Embassy to get further information from them on the situation but they knew very little about it and could not enlighten me at all. A small patrol was sent to the village of BROCKSTEIN to search for the train. When we contacted the station master he said there was a tunnel nearby but that there were only six locomotives and nine coal cars in it and that the locomotives were inoperative. Soon thereafter we located a Hungarian who spoke a little English. He was questioned and he said he knew the location of the train and its contents.

A Dr. Avar was contacted and he had papers showing exactly what the train contained. The contents of the train as reported by Dr. Avar were jewelry in the form of gold rings, bracelets, diamonds, ornaments, etc. Also large quantities of silverware, rugs, tapestry, oil paintings, and other materials were listed. The Austrian went with us into the tunnel and we walked for approximately 3½ miles before locating the cars. All of the cars were sealed and three locomotives were deadheaded on each end.

One car was opened to verify the fact that they did contain something of value. I inspected the contents of this one car and it contained oil paintings, tapestries, and rugs. As little as I knew about such values I was satisfied that the remainder of the cars were as reported by Dr. Avar. We did not feel that we had the authority to open any more cars. The patrol, wet and cold, headed for the exit and upon reaching the outside immediately contacted the station master and gave him till 1600 that afternoon to get those locomotives and all cars out of the tunnel. A Sgt. and one team of Troop "A" were left to see that these instructions were carried out to the letter and also to guard the cars upon their removal from the tunnel. At approximately 1500 two officers from CIC of XXI Corps arrived and began the task of collecting those officials who might be wanted by the Allied Government.

A patrol was dispatched to check on the train and by 1700 the locomotives and 25 cars containing the valuables were on a siding. The team of Troop "A" was informed of the contents and given the mission of protecting the cars. By 1900 the CIC had gathered the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Oshima and his Secretary Mr. Uchida; Mr. Willeckers, Mr. Harnaike; Dr. Lammers and his Secretary Capt. Priet; Dr. Funk and his Secretary Capt. Mahrwald and Dr. Ohnesorge. A guard was furnished by Troop "A" and the CIC men proceeded for Corps Hqs.

At 2000 the EO of the 101st Cavalry Group, Lt. Col. Mortenson, arrived and explained we were to be relieved that night but that he wanted additional information on the situation; also he

wanted definite proof that the RR cars contained valuables. Therefore it was decided to investigate the train further. At 2030 one platoon from Company "A", 506th Parachute Infantry Battalion, arrived to relieve the platoon of Troop "A". The company commander and platoon leader were oriented on the entire situation and the company commander agreed with Col. Mortenson that for the job to be performed satisfactorily it would take additional men. Col. Mortenson, Major French, and Capt. Wood went to the train to verify the contents. Dr. Avar produced his papers for Col. Mortenson explaining what the train contained. Four cars were opened and Col. Mortenson checked two cars which contained silverware, jewelry etc. and Capt. Wood checked two cars which contained rugs, tapestry and oil paintings. Both were satisfied that the train contained articles of great value. Dr. Avar valued the contents of the train at 25 million dollars.

The platoon of Company "A" completed the relief of Troop "A" and also established an additional post at the hotel which contained the Japanese Embassy. At 0400 another platoon of 506th Parachute Infantry arrived and at 0630 the team of Troop "A" at the train was relieved by this platoon. Col. Mortenson left a 0730 to rejoin Group Headquarters. At 0820 the platoon of Troop "A" left BADGASTEIN to rejoin the Squadron at ST. ULRICH, thus ending a most interesting experience for all. The platoon of Troop "A", commanded by St. Sgt. Schnalzer, is to be commended on the excellent manner in which it handled a difficult assignment and the soldierly manner in which all personnel conducted themselves."



A final word . . .



Acknowledgement of the aid given to the 101st Cavalry Group and its regularly attached units in turning in a superb combat performance is made here with the knowledge that the appreciation of each and every man in the original Group is wholehearted and sincere . . . to the Combat Engineers, Field Artillerymen, Medium Tankers, Tank Destroyers, IPW Team, Air Liaison Units and those unknown pilots, Ground Liaison Officers and Military Government Officers . . . to the bold and fast moving 92nd Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mecz.) which worked with the Group during the latter's attachment to the 12th Armored Division . . . What men! What units! What a TEAM!

All in all the regular units of the Group, including the Group Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 101st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mecz.) and 116th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mecz.) were in continuous combat operations against the enemy from February 9th, 1945 to May 5th, 1945 or for 85 consecutive days. During that period the Group captured more than fifteen (15) times its own strength in Prisoners of War or a total of 27,346. It moved forward through several hundred miles of contested territory, often sticking out into that territory like the proverbial "sore thumb". This boldness paid dividends in both missions accomplished and in an exceptionally low ratio of losses.

A total of forty-four officers and men were killed in action or died of their wounds and a total of one hundred and sixty-two were wounded. There is no way to balance out the personal loss and suffering of these fine young men. The price would be high under any circumstances but on a purely comparative basis and all things considered, including the actual accomplishments, these low losses speak volumes for things which can not be found in the book of "luck".

In addition there were eleven men reported missing in action which brought the total casualties to 217 or a fraction under 14 per cent. Only three men were known to be taken prisoner unwounded and on their feet. In each of these cases the circumstances were verified and in no instance was the honor of the individual compromised.

Fights and wars are not won with fine mottos but these men are proud to record the fact that each and every man lived up to the old regimental motto and gave . . .

"TO THE UTMOST!"



RECORD of EVENTS

Prior to January 4, 1945

- 27 JANUARY 1941** — 101st Cavalry Regiment (H-M), inducted into Federal Service at Brooklyn, N. Y., New York, N. Y. and Geneseo, N. Y. Colonel Gilbert E. Ackerman, commanding.
- 2 FEBRUARY 1941 to 28 SEPTEMBER 1941** — Training at Fort Devens, Mass.
- 29 SEPTEMBER 1941 to 6 DECEMBER 1941** — First Army Carolina Maneuvers.
- 7 DECEMBER 1941 to 3 SEPTEMBER 1942** — Training at Fort Devens, Mass. Detachments maintained security for Dow Field, Bangor, Me.
- (APRIL 1942** — 101st Cavalry Regiment (H-M) reorganized and redesignated 101st Cavalry Regiment, Mecz.)
- 4 SEPTEMBER 1942 to 25 OCTOBER 1942** — Field Training at Pine Camp, N. Y.
- 26 OCTOBER 1942 to 10 MARCH 1943** — Training at Fort Devens, Mass.
- 11 MARCH 1943 to 10 OCTOBER 1943** — Mobile Reserve, Eastern Defense Command, Fort George G. Meade, Md.
- (20 AUGUST 1943** — Colonel Charles B. McClelland assumed command of the Regiment.)
- 11 OCTOBER 1943 to 28 FEBRUARY 1944** — Mobile Force, Chesapeake Bay Sector, Eastern Defense Command with elements stationed at Camp Somerset, Md., Camp Ashby, Va., and Camp Branch, N. C.
- (21 DECEMBER 1943** — Reorganized and redesignated 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., comprised of Hq. & Hq. Troop, 101st Cav. Gp., Mecz., 101st Cav. Rcn Sq., Mecz., and 116th Cav. Rcn Sq., Mecz.
- 1 MARCH 1944 to 30 JUNE 1944** — Mobile Force, Southeastern Sector, Eastern Defense Command, with elements stationed at Eatontown, N. J., Port Republic, N. J., Georgetown, Del., Camp Somerset, Md., Fort Story, Va., Camp Branch, N. C., Carolina Beach, N. C., and Myrtle Beach, S. C.
- (JANUARY 1944** — 34th Cav. Rcn Sq., attached.)
- 1 JULY 1944 to 25 OCTOBER 1944** — Training and preparation for overseas movement at Camp Campbell, Ky.
- (AUGUST 1944** — 34th Cav. Rcn Sq., detached.)
- 26 OCTOBER 1944 to 30 OCTOBER 1944** — Staging for overseas movement at Camp Kilmer, N. J.
- 31 OCTOBER 1944 to 12 NOVEMBER 1944** — At sea enroute from New York Port of Embarkation to Liverpool, England.
- 13 NOVEMBER 1944 to 3 JANUARY 1945** — Training and preparing equipment for combat at Camp Anty Cross, Furness, England

What about YOUR story?



Every one has his own story to tell. A number of blank pages have been provided in the back of this booklet in order that you may make a permanent record of YOUR story.

One good way to approach the work of writing your story is to make notes and then to rewrite them several times until they are exact and to your liking. It is best not to try to do this in one sitting. Take the time necessary to do a good job but do not worry about style or fancy construction. The most important consideration is to keep your writing down to a simple statement of facts.

You will be aided in making a choice of material for your story by reading the Official History and studying the maps herein. Photographs are excellent reminders and can be used also to illustrate your story. Letters which you have written home and which have been saved form another good source of material.

You may tell your story as a narrative, highlighting outstanding experiences in much the same manner as in the outline history herein. If you are recounting an incident in which you are the only individual involved write in the "first person." Incidents involving yourself with others can be written in the "second person." You will find, however, that most of your story can be written best in the "third person."

Should you prefer not to write a running account you can jot down your experiences, observations, reactions and any other thoughts you have in connection with your combat service in a manner similar to that shown on the pages of "Random Shots" which follow.

Write YOUR story while it is fresh in your mind. It will be among your most prized possessions in the years to come. Send a copy of your story with any duplicate photographs which you may have to the 101st Cavalry Historical Board, 1579 Bedford Avenue, Brooklyn, New York.

Random Shots

We bumped across a railroad bridge just below the city of Landsburg. Later we passed through the city itself and past the old castle prison where Hitler had been imprisoned after the "Munich Beer Putsch". It was there he wrote "Mein Kampf".

Two rifle shots greeted us as we entered Landsburg. Snipers? No, just the climax for a two-timing gal whom we found very much dead on the second floor of a particularly disreputable Gasthaus. She was a DP and so was her four foot nine murderer who had used a sawed-off Mauser rifle. The only mystery about the case was the 12 — count 'em — 12 pairs of brand new real silk hose found in her packed suitcase.

A German general riding rapidly to the rear in a sporty little Opel sedan was overtaken by a couple of our point vehicles. After the Luger and other legal matters were settled the boys opened his suitcase which, believe it or not, was full of men's pure silk underwear.

The column had halted in the main street of Lauda. I had been talking to the boys in the CP half-track and was just about back to my own vehicle when the screaming



"gobble gobble" of nebelwerfer shells came overhead. I hit a pile of potatoes in a cellar with three men on top of me. After a respectful wait we surfaced and saw that the shells had hit near the halftrack. I searched through the dense cloud of smoke and dust fearfully. Not a man was scratched. No one will ever convince us that the prayers of the good folk at home were not working full force at that moment ... it was Easter Sunday.

After the group had taken a total number of PW's equal to its own strength we felt that, at least, we had paid our way over ... the final count was over 15 times our total strength ... and then we thought we had paid our way back home.

Random Shots

One of the first things to strike your attention after crossing the Danube is the "onion" type steeple seen on each village church. "Early Byzantine influence", the Padre explained. We looked at them with interest ... and for snipers!



We had been travelling through some of the most beautiful and productive country in the world and we could not help but wonder why these people should ever feel the need for something more; why they should want to leave their homes time and time again to inflict so much suffering and misery on their neighbors ... who have so much less!

We were amazed to find so much fine modern furniture in homes of modest size. It looked like the payoff goods of Nazi-Socialism. Many other items were in more than ample supply. It seemed that about the only thing we could not find in Germany was a Nazi.

What Germany needs most is a good interior decorator. Bavarian homes especially are cluttered with too much of everything. We should know because we saw more and different homes than even most Germans ever see, but if you see one you see them all. Trophies of the hunt and of shooting matches are

especially abundant; pictures of men relatives in uniform covering both past and present generations vie with small deer antlers for wall space, that is, after the inevitable picture of Adolf; knick-knacks stand in great profusion on every shelf ... and over all, in the small town and village homes, is the odor of urine and of decaying vegetables stored in the "keller".

Germany must be the home of that old joke about long beds and short sheets only the correct version should be "short beds and even shorter sheets". We are still trying to find a G I who mastered the problem of sleeping under one of those kraut feather comforters.

Another myth which was definitely exploded was that one about all German women being such fine housekeepers. Many of them could take a few lessons from the gals back home.

My Story
























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In Memoriam

Joseph H. Atkinson
John Bartole
Henry C. Bass
William A. Becker
Darius M. Blinson
James C. Bobo
Donald S. Brumfield
Grady L. Collins
Louis Cowen
William B. Elliott
Theodore E. Evanko
Bernard Fabian
Carmine J.C. Garafano
George T. Gardner
Stanley T. Gawlak
Robert D. Gillan
Bennie Gonzales
George W. Griffith
Gilbert Hack

Nevin I. Hamm
Harvey Hayes
Johann D. Hinck
Lewis A.R. Innerarity, Jr.
Anthony Ivinski
William A. Kornblum
Alfred Kupterschmidt
Preston H. Kurth
Dale A. Lackey
George P. Langton, Jr.
Barzilliai M. Lanning, Jr.
Marcus L. Lee
Bernard J. Lolos
Olaf D. Lupardus
Ira J. McCarty
Walter H. Mennel
Harvey H. Miller
Carl H. Moore
Thomas F. Niejadlik
Raymond R. Paquette

Charles N. Pierce
Wilfred A. Poulin
Charles M. Price
Morton S. Rodgers
John F. Rothengast
Robert K. Schafer
Joseph F. Tedesco
Everette G. Simoneaux
John F. Sturz
Jack L. Swanson
Thurman A. Swim
Harold L. Turk
Charles F. Vacek
Louis A. Vozzo
James W. Walton
Norman J. Wenger
Nolan D. Yeomans
Edward B. Young
Edwin M. Zajonczkoski

**that others may be free to
meet the challenge of peace**



- ★ PORTO RICO 1898
- ★ LORRAINE 1918
- ★ MEUSE ARGONNE 1918
- ★ YPRES-LYS 1918
- ★ SOMME OFFENSIVE 1918
- ★ FLANDERS 1918
- ★ RHINELAND 1945
- ★ CENTRAL EUROPE 1945

